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Abstract
I incorporate expectations-based reference-dependent preferences into a dynamic stochas-
tic model to explain three major life-cycle consumption facts; the intuitions behind these three
implications constitute novel connections between recent advances in behavioral economics
and prominent ideas in the macro consumption literature. First, expectations-based loss aver-
sion rationalizes excess smoothness and sensitivity in consumption, the puzzling empirical
observation of lagged consumption responses to income shocks. Intuitively, in the event of
an adverse shock, the agent delays painful cuts in consumption to allow his reference point to
decrease. Second, the preferences generate a hump-shaped consumption profile. Early in life,
consumption is low due to a first-order precautionary-savings motive, but as uncertainty re-
solves, this motive is dominated by time-inconsistent overconsumption, forcing consumption
to decline toward the end of life. Third, consumption drops at retirement. When uncertainty
is absent, the agent does not overconsume because he dislikes the associated certain loss in
future consumption. Additionally, I obtain several new predictions about consumption; com-
pare the preferences with habit formation, hyperbolic discounting, and temptation disutility;
and structurally estimate the preference parameters.
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I INTRODUCTION
Expectations-based reference-dependent preferences formalize the notion that changes in expec-
tations about consumption generate instantaneous utility; moreover, losses in expectations about
consumption hurt more than gains give pleasure. These preferences were developed by Koszegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) to discipline the insights of prospect theory1 and have since been
shown to explain behavioral evidence in a variety of domains. This paper incorporates these pref-
erences into a fully dynamic and stochastic consumption-savings model to explain three major life-
cycle consumption facts – excess smoothness and sensitivity in consumption, a hump-shaped con-
sumption profile, and a drop in consumption at retirement. The intuitions behind these implications
connect several prominent ideas. Expectations-based loss aversion makes consumption excessively
smooth, as unexpected cuts in consumption today are more painful than expected reductions in the
future. Moreover, expectations-based loss aversion introduces a first-order precautionary-savings
motive because expected fluctuations in consumption are less painful higher on the utility curve;
however, it also generates a time inconsistency because today the agent increases his consumption
above expectations, whereas yesterday he also considered how this increase in consumption would
have increased his expectations.
I first explain the preferences in greater detail. In each period, the agent’s instantaneous utility
consists of the following components. “Consumption utility” is determined by his level of con-
sumption and corresponds to the standard model of utility. “Contemporaneous and prospective
gain-loss utility” is determined by his expectations about consumption relative to his reference
point and corresponds to a prospect-theory model of utility. The agent’s reference point corre-
sponds to his prior beliefs about both his present consumption and his entire stream of future
consumption. The agent experiences “contemporaneous gain-loss utility” when he compares his
actual present consumption with his probabilistic beliefs about present consumption, experiencing
a sensation of gain or loss relative to each consumption outcome that he had previously expected.
1Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) states that people care about gains and losses relative to a refer-
ence point, whereby small losses hurt more than small gains give pleasure: people are loss averse.
2
Additionally, the agent experiences “prospective gain-loss utility” when he compares his updated
beliefs about future consumption with his previous beliefs, experiencing gain-loss utility over what
he has learned about future consumption. Thus, gain-loss utility can be interpreted as utility over
good and bad news.2
I analyze an agent with such “news-utility” preferences in a partial-equilibrium life-cycle con-
sumption model.3 The agent lives for a finite number of periods; at the beginning of each period,
he observes the realization of a permanent and transitory income shock and then optimally decides
how much to consume and save. I first assume that the agent’s consumption utility is an exponen-
tial function. This assumption produces a closed-form solution, which allows me to gain a precise
understanding of the intuitions behind the life-cycle consumption implications. Because the as-
sumption of exponential utility is often considered unrealistic, I show that all of the implications
hold if I instead assume a power-utility function.
As the first key implication, the preferences generate excess smoothness and sensitivity in con-
sumption, which refer to the inherently related empirical observations that consumption initially
underresponds to income shocks and then adjusts with a delay.4 Such consumption responses are
puzzling from the perspective of the standard model but are perfectly consistent with expectations-
based loss aversion.5 A simplified intuition is that unexpected losses in consumption today are
relatively more painful than expected losses in consumption tomorrow. Accordingly, the agent de-
lays painful reductions in consumption below expectations today until tomorrow, by which point
his expectations will have adjusted. This logic overcomes the fact that the agent experiences both
2Koszegi and Rabin (2009) develop the dynamic preferences from the static model of Koszegi and Rabin (2006,
2007) by introducing contemporaneous and prospective gain-loss utility in the instantaneous utility function. In so
doing, the authors generalize the static “outcome-wise” gain-loss comparison to a “percentile-wise” comparison. I
generalize the static comparison slightly differently and refer to this new comparison as the separated comparison,
as the agent separates realized and non-realized uncertainty, only experiencing gain-loss utility over uncertainty that
has been realized. For contemporaneous gain-loss utility, the two comparisons yield the same value. However, for
prospective gain-loss utility, the comparisons yield small quantitative differences. Because the separated comparison
is a linear operator and preserves an outcome-wise structure, the model is considerably more tractable. Moreover,
because the psychological intuition of the separated comparison is also reasonable, I see this modification as a minor
methodological contribution.
3Similar model environments are assumed by Carroll (2001) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
4See, e.g., Flavin (1985), Campbell and Deaton (1989), and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010).
5Alternative explanations exist, which I review in the next section.
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contemporaneous and prospective gain-loss utility. In the event of an adverse shock, contempo-
raneous losses loom larger than prospective losses because a share of the latter depends on future
uncertainty. This share is unaffected by today’s income shock because the agent’s future reference
point will have incorporated today’s shock and conditional changes in consumption.
Beyond resolving these puzzles, the preferences are consistent with another stylized fact about
lifetime consumption: a hump-shaped life-cycle consumption profile, which is characterized by
increasing consumption at the beginning but decreasing consumption toward the end of life.6 This
hump results from the net of two preference features, a first-order precautionary-savings motive
and a beliefs-based time inconsistency. First, the preferences motivate precautionary savings be-
cause loss aversion increases the painfulness of anticipated fluctuations in consumption, which
hurt, however, relatively less higher on the concave utility curve. Accordingly, this precautionary-
savings motive depends on concavity and is a first-order7 consideration, as opposed to the precautionary-
savings motive under standard preferences. Second, the preferences are subject to a beliefs-based
time inconsistency. The agent behaves inconsistently, because he takes his expectations as given
when increasing consumption today, but considers his expectations when increasing consumption
tomorrow. However, once tomorrow rolls around, he will only consider the joy of increasing
consumption above expectations. As a result, the agent overconsumes relative to his optimal pre-
committed consumption path that maximizes his expected utility. Consequently, the precautionary-
savings motive keeps consumption low at the beginning of life. However, the need for precaution-
ary savings decreases when uncertainty resolves over time. Then, the beliefs-based time inconsis-
tency causes overconsumption such that consumption is forced to decline by the end of life.
Finally, the preferences cause a drop in consumption at retirement.8 During retirement, income
6See, e.g., Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
7The precautionary-savings motive does not go to zero when uncertainty becomes small. Alternatively, in a first-
order approximation of savings, the effect of uncertainty depends on the second derivative of the utility function. In
contrast, in a second-order approximation of savings in the standard model, the effect of uncertainty depends on the
third derivative of the utility function. This result has been obtained by Koszegi and Rabin (2009) in a two-period,
two-outcome model.
8The empirical evidence regarding the prevalence of a drop in consumption at retirement is mixed. A series of
papers, e.g., Banks et al. (1998), Bernheim et al. (2001), and Battistin et al. (2009), find that consumption drops at
retirement, and my data display such a drop. However, Aguiar and Hurst (2005) find that the drop is absent when
properly controlling for health shocks, work-related expenses, and home production. In contrast, Schwerdt (2005)
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uncertainty is absent, which eliminates both the precautionary-savings motive and the beliefs-
based time inconsistency. The latter is eliminated because time-inconsistent overconsumption is
associated with a certain loss in future consumption. This certain loss hurts the agent more than his
overconsumption gives him pleasure; thus, he only overconsumes when allocating labor income,
which he was not sure to receive, rather than trading off a certain loss in future consumption.
Because the agent suddenly controls his time-inconsistent desire to overconsume, his consumption
drops at retirement. Beyond these three implications, the preferences generate several new and
testable predictions about consumption and savings.
This unified explanation for the three main life-cycle consumption facts, as surveyed by At-
tanasio and Weber (2010), validates the news-utility model in a domain that it was not designed to
explain. Moreover, I analyze habit-formation, hyperbolic-discounting, temptation-disutility, and
standard preferences to show that news utility is the only preference specification that provides
such a unified explanation independent of institutional or environmental assumptions that are com-
monly made in the literature, e.g., hump-shaped income profiles, liquidity constraints, preference
shifters, or non-separabilities of consumption and leisure. However, I believe that a more impor-
tant contribution is that the explanations’ intuitions connect several compelling concepts in both the
macro consumption literature and micro evidence that the preferences were designed to reconcile.
More precisely, I consider it a key contribution that two widely analyzed macro consumption
puzzles are explained by loss aversion. Loss aversion is an experimentally robust risk preference,
which has been used to explain both behavioral phenomena, such as the endowment and dispo-
sition effects, and macro phenomena, such as the equity-premium puzzle and stock market non-
participation.9 The intuition for these puzzles, that cutting consumption today is more painful than
finds a drop although he explicitly controls for home production and focuses on German retirees, who receive high
state-provided pensions and have health insurance.
9The endowment effect asserts that the willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for a good is greater than the
willingness to pay (WTP) for it once the good is in one’s possession, as once one owns the item, foregoing it feels
like a loss. The most famous study is Kahneman et al. (1990), in which students are given a mug and then offered the
chance to sell it. The authors find that participants’ WTA compensation for the mug is approximately twice as high as
their WTP for it. More recently, Ericson and Fuster (2010) demonstrate that subjects’ expectation to keep rather than
possess a good accounts for the gap between WTA and WTP. The disposition effect (Odean (1998)) is an anomaly
related to the tendency of investors to sell winners (stocks that have gone up in value) but keep losers (stocks that have
gone down in value) to avoid the realization of losses.
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cutting consumption tomorrow when the reference point has decreased, seems intuitively appeal-
ing and extends the importance of expectations-based endowment effects beyond mugs and pens.
Moreover, the resolution of the excess-smoothness puzzle nicely parallels the equity-premium puz-
zle because loss aversion makes consumption excessively smooth relative to changes in permanent
income.10 To explain the other life-cycle facts, the preferences intuitively unify precautionary
savings, which have been studied extensively in the standard consumption literature, and a beliefs-
based time inconsistency, which is reminiscent of hyperbolic discounting.
To quantitatively evaluate the model, I first calibrate it in line with the microeconomic liter-
ature; this exercise is straightforward, as all preference parameters have narrow ranges that are
determined by existing behavioral evidence and reasonable introspection. I then show that this
calibration simultaneously generates reasonable attitudes towards small and large wealth bets and
that the model’s quantitative predictions match the empirical evidence for the consumption puz-
zles.11 Beyond calibrating the model, I structurally estimate the preference parameters and obtain
estimates that match those found in the microeconomic literature.12 All five preference parameters
are identified because each parameter generates specific variation in consumption growth over the
life-cycle; this is not the case in existing structural estimations.13
The paper is organized as follows. After a literature review, I explain the model environment,
preferences, and equilibrium concept in Section III. Then, I derive the model’s main predictions
in closed form under the assumption of exponential utility in Section IV. After briefly outlining
the power-utility model, I then calibrate both models to assess whether the quantitative predictions
match the empirical evidence and structurally estimate the model’s parameters in Section V. Sec-
tion VI outlines several extensions and the model’s welfare implications. Section VII concludes.
10Because consumption is too smooth relative to movements in asset prices, a high equity premium in the canonical
asset-pricing economy requires unreasonably high second-order risk aversion.
11I use NIPA consumption and income data following Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001).
12I follow the two-stage method-of-simulated-moments methodology of Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and use
pseudo-panel data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey as provided by the NBER.
13For instance, Barseghyan et al. (2010) cannot separately identify the weight of gain-loss utility relative to con-
sumption utility and the coefficient of loss aversion.
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II LITERATURE REVIEW
I contribute to the life-cycle literature by exploring a new preference specification that has been
used in a variety of contexts to explain experimental and other microeconomic evidence.14 The
preferences’ predictions regarding consumption and savings modify and extend the two-period,
two-outcome model introduced by Koszegi and Rabin (2009). In particular, I generalize the im-
plications for precautionary savings, overconsumption in deterministic settings, and the potential
delay of reductions in consumption. Moreover, my paper relates to Bowman et al. (1999), in which
loss aversion causes delayed adjustments to adverse income shocks. However, in both Koszegi and
Rabin (2009) and Bowman et al. (1999), the agent delays losses only to remain at his deterministic
reference point.15 In contrast, I consider a model in which the reference point is stochastic, as con-
sumption is continuously distributed. The stochastic reference point induces delayed consumption
adjustments to both good and bad income shocks.
A very incomplete list of papers in the life-cycle consumption literature with standard prefer-
ences is Deaton (1991), Carroll (1997), and Gourinchas and Parker (2002). As shown by Lud-
vigson and Michaelides (2001), among others, any time-separable utility function cannot generate
excess smoothness in consumption. Borrowing constraints are a potential additional assumption;
however, the agent expects these constraints and ensures that they are not binding for most income
realizations. Angeletos et al. (2001) and Laibson et al. (2012) analyze hyperbolic-discounting
14Heidhues and Koszegi (2008, 2010), Herweg and Mierendorff (2012), and Rosato (2012) explore the implications
for consumer pricing, which are tested by Karle et al. (2011), Herweg et al. (2010) do so for principal-agent contracts,
and Eisenhuth (2012) does so for mechanism design. An incomplete list of papers providing direct evidence for
Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) preferences is Sprenger (2010) on the implications of stochastic reference points,
Abeler et al. (2012) on labor supply, Gill and Prowse (2012) on real-effort tournaments, Meng (2010) on the disposition
effect, and Ericson and Fuster (2010) on the endowment effect. Barseghyan et al. (2010) structurally estimate a model
of insurance-deductible choice. Suggestive evidence is provided by Crawford and Meng (2009) on labor supply,
Pope and Schweitzer (2011) on golf players’ performance, and Sydnor (2010) on deductible choice. Moreover, the
numerous conflicting papers on the endowment effect can be reconciled with the notion of expectations determining
the reference point. All of these papers consider the static preferences, but as the dynamic preferences of Koszegi and
Rabin (2009) are a straightforward extension, the evidence is equally valid for the dynamic preferences. Moreover,
the notion that agents are loss averse with respect to news about future consumption is indirectly supported by all
experiments, which use monetary payoffs because these concern future consumption.
15An asymmetric response to income innovations would also be predicted by liquidity constraints, the empirical
evidence for which is very mixed (see Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) for a survey). A famous paper by Shea (1995)
finds that consumption is more excessively sensitive to expected income declines than increases. The author notes that
this finding is inconsistent with liquidity constraints or myopia but consistent with loss aversion.
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preferences in a life-cycle context. The sophisticated hyperbolic-discounting agent restricts his
consumption opportunities with illiquid savings but can borrow up to some constraint.16 To the
extent that his borrowing constraint binds or his liquid asset holdings bunch at zero, his consump-
tion is excessively sensitive. Moreover, the standard and hyperbolic agents’ consumption profiles
are hump shaped under the assumption of power utility, sufficient impatience, and a hump-shaped
income profile.
By providing a purely preference-based explanation for the consumption puzzles, I resume a
literature pioneered by Fuhrer (2000) and Michaelides (2002), who assume internal multiplicative
habit formation. The basic concept of news utility appears similar to habit formation. However, the
life-cycle implications are very different; most important, I confirm the conclusion of Michaelides
(2002) that habit formation only generates excess smoothness at the cost of unreasonably high
wealth accumulation. Furthermore, Chetty and Szeidl (2010) incorporate adjustment costs in con-
sumption, and Reis (2006) assumes that agents face costs when processing information and thus
optimally decide to update their consumption plans sporadically.
III THE LIFE-CYCLE CONSUMPTION MODEL
I first define a general life-cycle model environment to formally introduce the preferences and
equilibrium concepts.
III.1 The model environment
The agent lives for a total of T discrete periods indexed by t ∈ {1, ...,T}. At the beginning of each
period, a vector St ∼ FSt realizes that consists of random shocks, which are independent of each
other and over time. The realization of St is denoted st . The model’s exogenous state variables are
16Demand for commitment is also generated by temptation-disutility preferences, as specified in Gul and Pesendor-
fer (2004) and analyzed by Bucciol (2012) in a life-cycle context.
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represented by the vector Zt , which evolves according to the following law of motion
Zt = f Z(Zt−1,St). (1)
After observing st and Zt , the agent decides how much to consume Ct .17 The model’s endogenous
state variable is cash-on-hand Xt+1 and is determined by the following budget constraint
Xt+1 = f X(Xt−Ct ,Zt ,St+1). (2)
All of the model’s variables that are indexed by t realize in period t. Because the agent’s pref-
erences are defined over both outcomes and beliefs, I explicitly define his probabilistic “beliefs”
about each of the model’s period t variables from the perspective of any prior period as follows.
Definition 1. Let It = {Xt ,Zt ,st} denote the agent’s information set in some period t ≤ t+τ; then,
the agent’s probabilistic beliefs about any model variable Vt+τ conditional on period t information
is denoted by F tVt+τ (v) = Pr(Vt+τ < v|It), and F t+τVt+τ is degenerate.
Throughout the paper, I assume rational expectations, i.e., the agent’s beliefs about any of the
model’s variables equal the objective probabilities determined by the economic environment.
III.2 Expectations-based reference-dependent preferences
Having outlined the model environment, I now introduce the agent’s preferences. To facilitate the
exposition, I first explain the static model of expectations-based reference dependence, as specified
in Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), and then introduce the dynamic model of Koszegi and Rabin
(2009).
17Throughout most of the paper, I consider a standard life-cycle environment in which the agent’s stochastic labor
income is Yt = f Y (Pt−1,S
p
t ,STt ), which depends on his permanent income Pt−1, a permanent shock SPt ∼ FSPt , and a
transitory shock STt ∼ FSTt . He decides how much to consume Ct and how much to save in a risk-free asset that pays a
net return r such that his cash-on-hand Xt+1 is determined by Xt+1 = (Xt −Ct)(1+ r)+Yt+1.
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The static preferences. The agent’s utility function consists of two components. First, he ex-
periences “consumption utility” u(c), which corresponds to the standard model of utility and is
solely determined by consumption c. Second, he experiences “gain-loss utility” µ(u(c)− u(r)).
The gain-loss utility function µ(·) corresponds to the prospect-theory model of utility determined
by consumption c relative to the reference point r. µ(·) is piecewise linear with slope η and a coef-
ficient of loss aversion λ , i.e., µ(x) = ηx for x> 0 and µ(x) = ηλx for x≤ 0. The parameter η > 0
weights the gain-loss utility component relative to the consumption utility component and λ > 1
implies that losses are weighed more heavily than gains, i.e., the agent is loss averse. Koszegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007) allow for stochastic consumption, distributed according to Fc(c), and a
stochastic reference point, distributed according to Fr(r). Then, the agent experiences gain-loss










A, the authors make the central assumption that the distribution of the reference point Fr equals the
agent’s fully probabilistic rational beliefs about consumption c.
The dynamic preferences. In the dynamic model of Koszegi and Rabin (2009), the utility func-
tion consists of consumption utility, “contemporaneous” gain-loss utility about current consump-
tion, and “prospective” gain-loss utility about the entire stream of future consumption. Thus, total
instantaneous utility in period t is given by




β τn(F t,t−1Ct+τ ). (4)
The first term in equation (4), u(Ct), corresponds to consumption utility in period t. Before turning
to the subsequent terms in equation (4), which consider consumption and beliefs, I define an “ad-
missible consumption function”. This function allows me to explicitly describe the probabilistic
structure of the agent’s beliefs about any of the model’s variables at any future date. Because the
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agent fully updates his beliefs in each period and because the shocks are independent over time,
I consider a stationary function that depends only on this period’s cash-on-hand Xt , the vector of
exogenous state variables Zt , the realization of the vector of shocks st , and calendar time t.
Definition 2. The consumption function in any period t is admissible if it can be written as a
function Ct = gt(Xt ,Zt ,st) that is strictly increasing in the realization of each shock
∂gt(Xt ,Zt ,st)
∂ st > 0.
Repeated substitution of the law of motion, equation (1), and the budget constraint, equation (2),
allows me to rewrite Ct+τ = gt+τ(Xt+τ ,Zt+τ ,St+τ) = htt+τ(Xt ,Zt ,st ,St+1, ...,St+τ).
I now return to the two remaining terms in equation (4). The first term, n(Ct ,F t−1Ct ), corresponds
to gain-loss utility over contemporaneous consumption; here, the agent compares his present con-
sumption Ct with his beliefs F t−1Ct . According to Definition 1, the agent’s beliefs F
t−1
Ct correspond
to the conditional distribution of consumption in period t given the information available in period
t−1. The agent experiences gain-loss utility over “news” about contemporaneous consumption as
follows






(u(Ct)−u(c))dF t−1Ct (c) (5)
where Ct and F t−1Ct (c) are explicitly described via the admissible consumption function, i.e., Ct =
gt(Xt ,Zt ,st) = ht−1t (Xt−1,Zt−1,st−1,st) and F t−1Ct (c) = Pr(h
t−1
t (Xt−1,Zt−1,st−1,St)< c).
The third term in equation (4), γ∑∞τ=1β τn(F
t,t−1
Ct+τ ), corresponds to gain-loss utility, experi-
enced in period t, over the entire stream of future consumption. Prospective gain-loss utility about
period t + τ consumption depends on F t−1Ct+τ , the agent’s beliefs he entered the period with, and
on F tCt+τ , the agent’s updated beliefs about consumption in period t + τ . Again the probabilis-
tic structure of these beliefs can be explicitly described via the admissible consumption function,
i.e., htt+τ(Xt ,Zt ,st ,St+1, ...,St+τ). Importantly, the prior and updated beliefs about Ct+τ , F
t−1
Ct+τ and
F tCt+τ , are not independent distribution functions because future shocks St+1, ...,St+τ are contained
in both. Thus, there exists a joint distribution, which I denote by F t,t−1Ct+τ 6= F tCt+τF t−1Ct+τ .18 Because
18I calculate prospective gain-loss utility n(F t,t−1Ct+τ ) by generalizing the “outcome-wise” comparison, specified in
11
the agent compares his newly formed beliefs with his prior beliefs, he experiences gain-loss utility
over “news” about future consumption as follows









(u(c)−u(r)))dF t,t−1Ct+τ (c,r) (7)
with F t,t−1Ct+.τ (c,r) given by F
t,t−1
Ct+τ (c,r) = Pr(h
t
t+τ(Xt−1,Zt−1,st−1,st ,St+1, ...,St+τ)< c,
ht−1t+τ(Xt−1,Zt−1,st−1,St ,St+1, ...,St+τ)< r).
The agent exponentially discounts prospective gain-loss utility by β ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, he
discounts prospective gain-loss utility relative to contemporaneous gain-loss utility by a factor
γ ∈ [0,1]. Thus, he puts the weight γβ τ < 1 on prospective gain-loss utility regarding consumption
in period t + τ . Because both contemporaneous and prospective gain-loss utility are experienced
over news, the preferences can be referred to as “news utility”.
III.3 The model solution
The news-utility agent’s lifetime utility in each period t = {1, ...,T} is








β τUt+τ ], (8)








If Fr and Fc are independent, equation (6) reduces to equation (15). However, if Fr and Fc are non-independent,
equation (6) and equation (15) yield different values. Suppose that Fr and Fc are perfectly correlated, as though no
update in information occurs. Equation (15) would yield a negative value because the agent experiences gain-loss
disutility over his previously expected uncertainty, which is unrealistic. In contrast, equation (6) would yield zero
because the agent considers the dependence of prior and updated beliefs, which captures future uncertainty, thereby
separating uncertainty that has been realized from uncertainty that has not been realized. Thus, I call this gain-
loss formulation the separated comparison. Koszegi and Rabin (2009) generalize the outcome-wise comparison to a
“percentile-wise” ordered comparison. The separated and ordered comparisons are equivalent for contemporaneous
gain-loss utility. However, for prospective gain-loss utility, they are qualitatively similar but quantitatively slightly
different. As a linear operator, the separated comparison is more tractable. Moreover, it simplifies the equilibrium-
finding process because it preserves the outcome-wise nature of contemporaneous gain-loss utility.
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where β ∈ [0,1), u(·) is a HARA19 utility function, η ∈ [0,∞), λ ∈ [1,∞), and γ ∈ [0,1]. I also con-
sider hyperbolic-discounting or βδ−preferences, as developed by Laibson (1997); the βδ−agent’s
lifetime utility is given by u(Cbt )+bEt [∑
T−t
τ=1β
τu(Cbt+τ)] where b∈ [0,1] is the hyperbolic-discount
factor. Needless to say, standard preferences, as analyzed by Carroll (2001), Gourinchas and Parker
(2002), or Deaton (1991), are a special case of the above models for either η = 0 or b= 1. I now de-
fine two equilibrium concepts: the monotone-personal equilibrium and monotone-pre-committed
equilibrium.
The monotone-personal equilibrium. I define the model’s “monotone-personal” equilibrium in
the spirit of the preferred-personal equilibrium solution concept, as defined by Koszegi and Rabin
(2009), but within the outlined environment and admissible consumption function as follows.
Definition 3. The family of admissible consumption functions Ct = gt(Xt ,Zt ,st) is a monotone-
personal equilibrium for the news-utility agent if, in any contingency, Ct = gt(Xt ,Zt ,st) maximizes
(8) subject to (2) and (1) under the assumption that all future consumption corresponds to Ct+τ =
gt+τ(Xt+τ ,Zt+τ ,st+τ). In each period t, the agent takes his beliefs about consumption {F t−1Ct+τ}T−tτ=0
as given in the maximization problem.
The monotone-personal equilibrium can be obtained by simple backward induction; thus, it is
time consistent in the sense that beliefs map into correct behavior and vice versa. In other words, I
derive the equilibrium consumption function under the premise that the agent enters period t, takes
his beliefs as given, optimizes over consumption, and rationally expects to behave in this manner
in the future. If I obtain a consumption function by backward induction that is admissible, then
the monote-personal equilibrium corresponds to the preferred-personal equilibrium as defined by
Koszegi and Rabin (2009). For the hyperbolic-discounting agent, the monotone-personal equilib-
rium corresponds to the solution of Laibson (1997).
19A utility function u(c) exhibits hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) if the risk tolerance − u′′(c)u′(c) is a linear
function of c.
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The monotone-pre-committed equilibrium. The monotone-personal equilibrium maximizes
the agent’s utility in each period t when he takes his beliefs as given. However, if the agent
could pre-commit to his consumption in each possible contingency, he would choose a different
consumption path. I define this path as the model’s “monotone-pre-committed” equilibrium in the
spirit of the choice-acclimating equilibrium concept, as defined by Koszegi and Rabin (2007), but
within the outlined environment and admissible consumption function as follows.
Definition 4. The family of admissible consumption functions, Ct = gt(Xt ,Zt ,st) for each period
t, is a monotone-pre-committed equilibrium for the news-utility agent, if, in any contingency, Ct =
gt(Xt ,Zt ,st) maximizes (8) subject to (2) and (1) under the assumption that all future consumption
corresponds to Ct+τ = gt+τ(Xt+τ ,Zt+τ ,st+τ). In each period t, the agent’s maximization problem
determines both his beliefs {F t−1Ct+τ}T−tτ=0 and consumption {Ct+τ}T−tτ=0.
I derive the equilibrium consumption function under the premise that the agent can pre-commit
to an optimal, history-dependent consumption path for each possible future contingency and thus
jointly optimizes over consumption and beliefs. This equilibrium is not time consistent because the
agent would deviate if he were to take his beliefs as given and optimize over consumption alone.
Equilibrium existence and uniqueness. I demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the
monotone-personal and monotone-pre-committed equilibria for special environments, such as ex-
ponential utility and permanent and transitory normal shocks, and under certain parameter con-
ditions. In particular, FSt must be sufficiently dispersed such that the equilibrium consumption
functions fall into the class of admissible consumption functions. For the monotone-pre-committed
equilibrium, an additional parameter constraint η(λ−1)< 1 is required to ensure global concavity
of the agent’s maximization problem. For other environments, such as power utility and perma-
nent and transitory log-normal shocks, simulations using numerical backward induction suggest
that the monotone-personal and monotone-pre-committed equilibria exist and are unique for most
reasonable calibrations.20
20Carroll (2011) and Harris and Laibson (2002) demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of equilibria for the
standard and sophisticated hyperbolic-discounting agent in similar environments. In these models, the equilibrium
14
IV THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS ABOUT CONSUMPTION
In the following, I explain the closed-form solution of the exponential-utility model in detail to
illustrate the model’s predictions formally and intuitively. After briefly outlining the model’s
monotone-personal equilibrium in Proposition 1, I flesh out the second-to-last period’s decision
problem to explain the model’s theoretical predictions. Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 formalize
excess smoothness and sensitivity in consumption. Lemma 1 discusses how the precautionary-
savings motive competes with the prospective gain-loss discount factor; the net of these forces
leads to a hump-shaped consumption profile, which is formalized in Proposition 3. Proposition
4 determines consumption during retirement, and Proposition 5 characterizes when consumption
drops at retirement. After these main predictions, I discuss several more subtle consumption im-
plications and new comparative statics. Finally, Proposition 6 characterizes the implications of the
monotone-pre-committed equilibrium.
I begin by briefly explaining the model’s environment and stating the equilibrium consumption
function to convey a general impression of the model’s solution. The agent’s utility function is
exponential u(C) =− 1θ e−θC, where θ ∈ (0,∞). His additive income process Yt = Pt−1+ sPt + sTt is
characterized by a permanent SPt ∼N(µPt ,σ2Pt) and transitory STt ∼N(µTt ,σ2Tt) normal shocks, and
his permanent income is Pt =Pt−1+sPt+1. His end-of-period asset holdings are denoted At =Xt−Ct
and his budget constraint is given by
Xt+1 = (Xt−Ct)(1+ r)+Yt+1⇒ At+1 = AtR+Yt+1−Ct+1. (9)
In Appendix B.2.1, I show that the agent’s optimal consumption function is
Ct = (1−a(T − t))(1+ r)At−1+Pt−1+ sPt +(1−a(T − t))sTt −a(T − t)Λt . (10)
consumption functions fall in the class of admissible consumption functions. For the standard agent, the monotone-
personal equilibrium corresponds to the pre-committed equilibrium. For the sophisticated hyperbolic-discounting
agent, the monotone-personal equilibrium does not correspond to the monotone-pre-committed equilibrium, which
instead corresponds to the standard agent’s equilibrium.
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His consumption depends on his assets, income, horizon, and interest rate; the latter two are cap-












ψt + γQt(ηF(sPt +(1−a(T − t))sTt )+ηλ (1−F(sPt +(1−a(T − t))sTt ))
1+ηF(sPt +(1−a(T − t))sTt )+ηλ (1−F(sPt +(1−a(T − t))sTt ))
),
(11)
where F(·) = FSPt +(1−a(T−t))STt (·) and ψt and Qt are constant. Thus, Λt varies with the shock
realizations but is independent of permanent income or assets.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique monotone-personal equilibrium in the finite-horizon exponential-
utility model if
√
σ2Pt +(1−a(i))2σ2Tt ≥ σ∗t for all t ∈ {1, ...,T}.
The standard and hyperbolic-discounting agents’ monotone-personal equilibria have the same
structure except that Λst and Λbt only vary with the agent’s horizon. This proof and proofs of the
following propositions can be found in Appendix B.4. All of the following propositions are derived
within this model environment and hold in any monotone-personal equilibrium if one exists.
IV.1 Excess smoothness and sensitivity in consumption
Excess smoothness and sensitivity in consumption are two robust empirical observations, which
emerged from tests of the permanent income hypothesis. The permanent income hypothesis pos-
tulates that the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income shocks is one and that
future consumption growth is not predictable using past variables. However, numerous studies find
that the marginal propensity to consume is less than one because consumption underresponds to
permanent income shocks; thus, consumption is excessively smooth according to Deaton (1986).
Moreover, numerous studies find that past changes in income have predictive power for future
consumption growth because consumption adjusts with a delay; thus, consumption is excessively
sensitive according to Flavin (1985). Campbell and Deaton (1989) explain how these observations
are intrinsically related; consumption underresponds to permanent income shocks and thus adjusts
with a delay. In this spirit, I define excess smoothness and sensitivity for the exponential-utility
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model as follows.21
Definition 5. Consumption is excessively smooth if ∂Ct∂ sPt < 1 everywhere and excessively sensitive
if ∂∆Ct+1∂ sPt
> 0 everywhere.
This definition has an empirical analogue: an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of period
t + 1 consumption growth on the realization of the permanent shock in periods t + 1 and t; for
the two OLS coefficients β1 and β2, the above definition implies that consumption is excessively
smooth if β1 = ∂Ct∂ sPt |sPt =µPt < 1 and excessively sensitive if β2 =
∂∆Ct+1
∂ sPt
|sPt =µPt > 0.
Proposition 2. The news-utility agent’s consumption is excessively smooth and sensitive.
I briefly present a simplified intuition for this result to then explain the agent’s first-order con-
dition in greater detail and provide the full intuition. The agent’s marginal gain-loss utility today
is more sensitive to his savings than his marginal gain-loss utility tomorrow, as his reference point
today is invariable while his reference point tomorrow will have adjusted to his savings plan today.
As a result, in the event of an adverse shock, the agent prefers to delay the reduction in consump-
tion until his reference point has decreased. Additionally, in the event of a good shock, the agent
prefers to delay the increase in consumption until his reference point has increased.
To explain this result in greater detail, I flesh out the agent’s decision-making problem in the
second-to-last period assuming that transitory shocks are absent, AT−2 = PT−2 = 0, and the per-
manent income shock is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal SPT−1,S
P
T ∼ FP =
N(µP,σP). In period T −1, the agent chooses how much to consume CT−1 and save sPT−1−CT−1.
His optimal consumption growth is given by







I explain each component of the fraction in equation (12) in detail. The denominator is marginal
consumption and contemporaneous gain-loss utility in period T−1; the latter consists of two terms.
First, the agent compares his actual consumption to all consumption outcomes that would have
21This result can be generalized to a HARA utility function, arbitrary horizons, and arbitrary income uncertainty.
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been less favorable and experiences a gain weighted by η , i.e., η
´ CT−1
−∞ (u(CT−1)−u(c))FT−1CT (c).
Second, the agent compares his actual consumption to all outcomes that would have been more fa-





the agent takes his beliefs as given in the monotone-personal equilibrium, his marginal consump-
tion and marginal contemporaneous gain-loss utility equals
u′(CT−1)+u′(CT−1)(ηFT−2CT−1(CT−1)+ηλ (1−FT−2CT−1(CT−1)))). (13)
This expression can be simplified by replacing FT−2CT−1(CT−1) with FP(s
P
T−1) because any admissible
consumption function is increasing in the shock realization.
The second term of the numerator in equation (12) is marginal prospective gain-loss utility
over future consumption CT = (sPT−1−CT−1)(1+ r)+ sPT−1+SPT . I denote the expected marginal
utility of the last period’s income shock QT−1 = βET−1[u′(SPT )].22 As the agent’s admissible future
consumption is increasing in the shock realization and he takes his beliefs as given, his marginal
prospective gain-loss utility corresponds to the same weighted sum of FP(sPT−1)
(1+ r)u′((sPT−1−CT−1)(1+ r)+ sPT−1)γQT−1(ηFP(sPT−1)+ηλ (1−FP(sPT−1))). (14)
The first term of the numerator in equation (12) is marginal future consumption and gain-loss
utility. I denote the expected marginal consumption and gain-loss utility of the last period’s income




marginal expected consumption and gain-loss utility are given by (1+r)u′((sPT−1−CT−1)(1+r)+
sPT−1)ψT−1.
The fraction in equation (12) is increasing in sPT−1 for any γ iff ψT−1 > QT−1. The difference
betweenψT−1 and QT−1 corresponds to expected marginal gain-loss utility that is constant because
the future reference point adjusts to today’s savings plan. Thus, a positive share of tomorrow’s
marginal utility is inelastic to today’s savings, which implies that tomorrow’s marginal utility is less
22Exponential utility implies that u′(∗+ ·) = u′(∗)u′(·) and thus works well with additive risk.
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sensitive to changes in savings than today’s marginal utility. Today’s marginal contemporaneous
and prospective gain-loss utility is relatively high or low in the event of an adverse or positive
shock. In contrast, expected marginal gain-loss utility is constant because tomorrow’s reference
point will have adjusted to today’s plan. Thus, the agent will consume relatively more in the event
of an adverse shock and relatively less in the event of a positive shock. According to Definition 5,
consumption is excessively smooth ∂CT−1∂ sPT−1
< 1 and excessively sensitive ∂∆CT∂ sPT−1
> 0.




θ log((1+ r)QT−1), and





the consumption of these agents is neither excessively smooth nor excessively sensitive.
IV.2 The hump-shaped consumption profile
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007), among others, show that lifetime consumption profiles
are hump shaped, even when controlling for cohort, family size, number of earners, and time ef-
fects.23 In the following, I demonstrate that the preferences generate a hump-shaped consumption
profile as a result of the net of two competing features – an additional first-order precautionary-
savings motive and the agent’s discount factor on prospective gain-loss utility γ .
Precautionary savings and prospective news discounting. Income uncertainty has a first-order
effect on savings in the news-utility model. This “first-order precautionary-savings motive” is
added to the precautionary savings motive of the standard agent, which is a second-order motive.24
This result is highlighted by Koszegi and Rabin (2009) in a two-period, two-outcome model.25





However, the agent wishes to increase his consumption and decrease his savings if he dis-
23Moreover, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) find suggestive evidence that non-separability between con-
sumption and leisure, which was promoted by Attanasio (1999) and previous papers, cannot explain more than 20%
of the hump in consumption.
24Refer to Gollier (2001).
25This result and those following can be generalized to any HARA utility function, arbitrary horizons, and labor
income uncertainty.
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counts prospective gain-loss utility relative to contemporaneous gain-loss utility, i.e., γ < 1. This
discounting is reminiscent of βδ−preferences. The following lemma formalizes these two oppos-
ing forces.
Lemma 1.
1. Precautionary savings: News utility introduces a first-order precautionary-savings motive.
2. Implications for consumption growth: There exists a γ¯s < 1, implicitly determined by ∆CT =
∆CsT , such that, iff γ¯
s < γ , the news-utility agent’s consumption growth in period T is higher than






The intuition for the first part of the lemma is as follows. The agent anticipates being exposed
to gain-loss fluctuations in period T , which are painful in expectation because losses hurt more than
gains give pleasure. Additionally, the painfulness of these fluctuations is proportional to marginal
consumption utility, which is lower higher on the utility curve. Thus, the agent has an additional
incentive to increase savings. The intuition for the second part of the lemma is straightforward.
If γ < 1, the agent is more concerned about contemporaneous than prospective gain-loss utility;
thus, he wishes to increase his consumption and decrease his savings. Consequently, the presence
of news utility might increase or decrease consumption relative to the standard model depending
on the net of two parameters σP > 0 and γ < 1.
In the following, I develop a more formal intuition for the standard and additional precautionary-
savings motive and demonstrate that the assumption ψT−1 > QT−1, which I made previously,
always holds. As shown above, the marginal value of savings is (1+ r)u′((sPT−1−CT−1)(1+






The integral in equation (15) reflects the expected marginal utility of all gains and losses, which
partly cancel, such that only the overweighted component of the losses remains, i.e., η(λ −
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1)(·). The key point is that this integral is always positive if u′′ < 0 and thus captures the ad-




|σP=0 > 0, this motive is first order, as the news-utility agent is first-
order risk averse. In contrast, the standard precautionary-savings motive is captured by QT−1 =
βET−1[u′(SPT )], which is larger than βu′(ET−1[ST ]) if u′′′ > 0, according to Jensen’s inequality.




|σP=0 = 0, as the
standard agent is second-order risk averse.26
The resulting hump-shaped consumption profile. The two competing news-utility features –
the additional precautionary-savings motive and γ < 1 – make it likely that the life-cycle consump-
tion profile is hump shaped.
Definition 7. I say that the agent’s consumption profile is hump shaped if consumption is increas-
ing at the beginning of his life ∆C1 > 0 and decreasing ∆CT < 0 at the end of his life.
Proposition 3. Suppose σPt = σP for all t and T is large; then, there exists a σP in [σP,σP]
such that, if γ < 1, log((1+ r)β ) ∈ [− M,M], and M is small, the news-utility agent’s lifetime
consumption path is hump shaped.
The basic intuition is illustrated in Lemma 1. The relative strengths of the additional precautionary-
savings motive and γ < 1 determine whether the presence of gain-loss utility increases or decreases
the news-utility agent’s consumption relative to the standard model. When the agent’s horizon
increases, the precautionary-savings motive accumulates because uncertainty accumulates. Ac-
cordingly, at the beginning of life, the presence of gain-loss utility is likely to reduce consumption
and increase consumption growth unless γ is small. Toward the end of life, however, the addi-
tional precautionary-savings motive is relatively small, and γ < 1 is likely to decrease consumption
growth. More formally, the two conditions ∆Ct+1 ≶ 0 reduce to Λt ≶ 0 as T − t becomes large or
26As shown by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis et al. (2001), first-order risk aversion resolves the equity
premium puzzle, which highlights that agents must have implausibly high second-order risk aversion to reconcile
the historical equity premium because aggregate consumption is smooth compared with asset prices. The excess-
smoothness puzzle highlights that aggregate consumption is too smooth compared to labor income, and again, first-
order instead of second-order risk aversion is a necessary ingredient for resolving the puzzle.
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T − t becomes small. The sign of Λt is determined by the relative values of ψtQt > 1 and γ < 1. As
T − t increases, ψtQt increases such that γ < 1 loses relative importance and Λt is more likely to be
positive. In contrast, ψT−1QT−1 is small such that γ < 1 is likely to cause ΛT−1 to be negative.
IV.3 News-utility consumption during and at retirement
IV.3.1 News-utility consumption during retirement
I now add a retirement period at the end of life. I assume that in periods t ∈ {T −R,T}, the agent
earns his permanent income without uncertainty. I first formalize a general prediction of the news-
utility agent’s consumption during retirement, in which I generalize a result obtained by Koszegi
and Rabin (2009) in a two-period model.27
Proposition 4. If uncertainty is absent, both the monotone-personal equilibrium and monotone-
pre-committed equilibrium of the news-utility agent correspond to the standard agent’s equilibria
iff γ ≥ 1λ . Iff γ < 1λ then the monotone-pre-committed equilibrium of the news-utility agent corre-
sponds to the standard agent’s equilibrium and the monotone-personal equilibrium of the news-
utility agent corresponds to a βδ−agent’s monotone-personal equilibrium with the hyperbolic-
discount factor given by b = 1+γηλ1+η .
The news-utility agent is likely to follow the standard agent’s path if uncertainty is absent.
The basic intuition is that the agent associates a certain loss in future consumption, which is
very painful, with an increase in present consumption. Thus, unless the agent discounts prospec-
tive gain-loss utility significantly, he follows the utility-maximizing standard agent’s path. More
formally, suppose that the agent allocates his deterministic cash-on-hand between consumption
today CT−1 and tomorrow CT . Under rational expectations, he cannot fool himself; hence, he
cannot experience actual gain-loss utility in equilibrium in a deterministic model. Accordingly, his
expected-utility maximization problem corresponds to the standard agent’s maximization problem,
and his monotone-pre-committed equilibrium thus corresponds to the standard agent’s problem
27This result can be generalized to a HARA utility function.
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determined by u′(CT−1) = β (1+ r)u′(CT ). Suppose that the agent’s beliefs about consumption
in both periods correspond to this pre-committed equilibrium path. Taking his beliefs as given,
the agent will deviate if the gain from consuming more today exceeds the discounted loss from
consuming less tomorrow, i.e.,
u′(CT−1)(1+η)> β (1+ r)u′(CT )(1+ γηλ ).
Thus, he follows the standard agent’s path iff γ ≥ 1λ because the pain of the certain loss in future
consumption is greater than the pleasure gained from present consumption. However, if γ < 1λ , the
agent chooses a consumption path that just meets the consistency constraint and behaves as a βδ−
or hyperbolic-discounting agent with hyperbolic discount factor b = 1+γηλ1+η < 1.
IV.3.2 News-utility consumption at retirement
During retirement, the implications of the agent’s prospective gain-loss discount factor γ are sim-
ple: it needs to be sufficiently low to overcome the certain loss in future consumption. I now ex-
amine the pre-retirement period to derive two additional implications of γ < 1. The first concerns
a drop in consumption at retirement, and the second shows how excess sensitivity in consumption
arises in the absence of future uncertainty.
The drop in consumption at retirement. The empirical evidence on the prevalence of a drop in
consumption at retirement is mixed. While a series of papers (see Attanasio and Weber (2010) for a
survey) have found that consumption drops at retirement, Aguiar and Hurst (2005) cannot confirm
this finding when controlling for the sudden reduction of work-related expenses, the substitution
of home production for market-purchased goods and services, and health shocks. In my data, I find
such a drop in consumption at retirement even for non-work-related expenditures. Moreover, I con-
sider the evidence provided by Schwerdt (2005) compelling because the author explicitly controls
for home production and focuses on German retirees, who receive large state-provided pensions,
which require little self organization, and for whom health is a complement to consumption thanks
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to proper insurance coverage. I first define a drop in consumption as follows.
Definition 8. There occurs a drop in consumption at retirement if consumption growth at retire-
ment ∆CT−R is negative and smaller than consumption growth after retirement ∆CT−R+1.
As an example, if γ ≥ 1λ , the news-utility agent’s post-retirement consumption growth equals
that of the standard agent’s, i.e., 1θ log(β (1+ r)) ≈ 0, whereas consumption growth at retirement
is 1θ log(β (1+ r)) +
1
θ g
s with gs ∈ {log(1+γηλ1+ηλ ), log(1+γη1+η )} < 0 for the news-utility agent and
remains zero for the standard agent.28
Proposition 5. If γ < 1, log((1+r)β )∈ [−M,M], andM is small, the news-utility agent’s monotone-
personal consumption path is characterized by a drop at retirement.
After the beginning of retirement the agent is less inclined to overconsume than before. The
basic intuition for overconsumption in the pre-retirement period is that the agent allocates house
money, i.e., labor income that he was not certain that he would receive, and thus prefers to surprise
himself with additional consumption today iff γ < 1. During retirement, the agent associates a
certain loss in future consumption with a surprise in present consumption. In contrast, in the pre-
retirement period, the agent finds the loss in future consumption merely as painful as a slightly
less favorable realization of his labor income, i.e., the agent trades off being somewhere in the gain
domain today versus being somewhere in the gain domain tomorrow instead of a sure gain today
with a sure loss tomorrow. The agent’s first-order condition in period T −1 absent uncertainty in
period T is given by




In equation (16), it can immediately be seen that iff γ = 1, contemporaneous and prospective
marginal gain-loss utility cancel. However, iff γ < 1, the agent reduces the weight on future util-
ity relative to present utility by a factor between 1+γηλ1+ηλ and
1+γη
1+η < 1. During retirement, the
28This and the following results can be generalized to a HARA utility function, arbitrary horizons, and arbitrary
income uncertainty.
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news-utility agent follows the standard agent’s consumption path if γ is sufficiently high and
a βδ−agent’s consumption path with discount factor b = 1+γηλ1+η otherwise. Because 1+γη1+η <
min{1+γηλ1+η ,1} iff γ < 1, the agent’s factor that reduces the weight on future utility is necessarily
lower in the pre-retirement period than after retirement, which implies that a drop in consumption
occurs at retirement.29 The other agents’ consumption paths do not exhibit a drop in consumption
at retirement.
I believe that the drop in consumption is an interesting prediction because it is driven by the
reduction in income uncertainty rather than a drop in income at retirement. Nevertheless, this
prediction depends entirely on the assumption of no uncertainty during retirement; needless to say,
this assumption is rather unrealistic.30 Furthermore, if I were to observe a consumption path that is
much flatter during retirement than before retirement and interpret this finding from the perspective
of the standard model, I may conclude that the agent does not decumulate assets sufficiently rapidly
after retirement compared to his pre-retirement asset decumulation. Thus, the model is able to
explain another puzzle observed by Bucciol (2012) and Disney (1996), namely, the lack of asset
decumulation during retirement.
Excess sensitivity in the pre-retirement period. In the following, I outline an additional result
regarding excess sensitivity in the pre-retirement period.31 This prediction is related to Proposition
7 in Koszegi and Rabin (2009), in which the authors find that if 1λ < γ < 1, then the news-utility
agent might entirely consume small gains but entirely delay small losses when he is surprised by
29What happens if uncertainty in the pre-retirement period becomes small? The model’s result depends on the
support of uncertainty. First, suppose the agent expects a continuous shock, the variance of which becomes small.
So long as a monotone-personal equilibrium exists, there occurs a drop at retirement. However, if the variance of the
shock becomes very small, the agent will follow a flat consumption path at some point. Nevertheless, the agent will
not be able to follow his deterministic consumption path, but reduces the weight on future marginal value by a factor in
the range of { 1+γη1+η , 1+γηλ1+η }. Thus, if 1λ ≤ γ ≤ 1, there occurs a drop for good realizations, and if γ < 1λ , there occurs
a drop for all realizations. Second, suppose the agent expects a shock with some probability. If the probability of
a shock occurring becomes small, the agent’s consumption in the pre-retirement period approaches his deterministic
consumption path; this eliminates the drop because the agent’s first-order condition is no longer subject to a change in
the weighting of future versus present marginal value.
30The assumption of no uncertainty during retirement is made in all standard life-cycle consumption model, as they
abstract from portfolio choice. Moreover, because mortality risk does not affect my result, the drop in consumption at
retirement is a necessary artifact of news-utility preferences in the standard life-cycle environment.
31This result can be generalized to a HARA utility function, arbitrary horizons, and arbitrary income uncertainty.
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them.32
Corollary 1. Iff γ < 1, the news-utility agent’s monotone-personal equilibrium consumption is
excessively smooth and sensitive in the pre-retirement period.
The basic intuition is that the agent can effectively reduce his sense of loss by delaying the cut
in consumption. Iff γ < 1, the agent cares more about contemporaneous than prospective gain-
loss utility and thus overconsumes in the presence of uncertainty, as explained above. Moreover,
he overconsumes even more when experiencing a relatively bad realization because losses are
overweighted. Because the agent overconsumes relatively more in the event of a bad shock and
relatively less in the event of a good shock, he delays his adjustment to consumption. Math-
ematically, the agent behaves like a βδ−agent, weighting future consumption by a factor of
b ∈ {1+γηλ1+ηλ , 1+γη1+η }. Thus, the agent’s weight on future consumption is particularly low when
the income realization is relatively bad, i.e., FP(sPT−1) ≈ 0. In turn, variation in FP(sPT−1) leads to





) and consumption is ex-
cessively smooth and sensitive because an increase in the permanent shock increases the fraction
determining ∆CT . Moreover, for any given η and λ consumption is more excessively smooth and
sensitive if γ is low.
IV.4 New predictions about news-utility consumption
In the following, I highlight several additional news-utility predictions for life-cycle consumption
that are new and testable comparative statics. I first explain the agent’s consumption function,
equation (10), in detail to highlight some subtle predictions about how the marginal propensity
to consume varies with the realization of the permanent and transitory shocks and the agent’s
32In this example, the agent’s consumption is excessively smooth and sensitive for surprise losses, but the opposite
is true for surprise gains. In the same setup, the agent’s consumption would also be excessively smooth and sensitive,
according to Definition 5, for gains if they are sufficiently large and thus not entirely consumed or if they are expected.
The agent might entirely consume an unexpected gain because it brings about a change in the weighting of future
versus present marginal value in the agent’s first-order condition. More formally, absent uncertainty, the agent follows
the standard agent’s path, as 1λ < γ , whereas in the event of a surprise gain, he puts a weight of
1+γηλ
1+η < 1 on future
consumption. Thus, if the gain is small, the change in the weight the agent places on future marginal consumption
utility induces the agent to consume the entire gain.
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horizon. To illustrate the implications of the additive consumption function, I assume that T − t is
large such that a(T − t) ≈ 11+r . Then, in each period t, the agent consumes the interest payments
of his last period’s asset holdings rAt−1, his entire permanent income Pt−1+ sPt , and the per-period
value of his temporary shock r1+r s
T
t . Λt captures the agent’s patience compared to the market,
his precautionary savings, and his marginal gain-loss utility. In the event of a negative shock, Λt
is low and the agent consumes more out of his end-of-period asset holdings and thus spreads the
consumption adjustment to his entire future. Λt varies more with the permanent shock than with the
transitory shock because the agent is only consuming the per-period value of the transitory shock,
such that F t−1Ct (Ct) varies little with it. This observation constitutes the first novel prediction of the
news-utility model: consumption is more excessively sensitive for permanent than for transitory
shocks in an environment with permanent shocks. In an environment with transitory shocks alone,
however, news-utility consumption is excessively sensitive with respect to transitory shocks.
A second prediction is that the degree of excess smoothness and sensitivity is decreasing in in-
come uncertainty σP. If σP is small, the agent’s beliefs change more rapidly relative to the change
in the realization of the shock; hence, the consumption function is more flat for realizations around
µP.33 A third prediction is that any bell-shaped shock distribution induces bounded variation in Λt
and thus the agent’s excess sensitivity. If the agent is affected by a tail realization, the actual value
of the low-probability shock matters less because neighboring states have very low probability;
thus, the variation in Λt is bounded. A fourth prediction is that consumption is more excessively
33I return to the two-period, one-shock model to discuss an interesting prediction of flat consumption. Suppose
that the absolute level of the shock increases; then, holding CT−1 constant, the marginal value of savings declines
and the agent’s first-order condition implies that consumption should increase. However, FP(sPT−1) also increases, and
marginal gain-loss utility is lower, such that the agent’s optimal consumption should decrease. Suppose that sPT−1 in-
creases marginally but FP(sPT−1) increases sharply, which could occur when FP is a narrow, bell-shaped distribution. In
this case, the lower marginal gain-loss utility that decreases consumption dominates such that the first-order condition
predicts decreasing consumption over some range in the neighborhood of the expected value µP where FP increases
most sharply. However, a decreasing consumption function cannot be an equilibrium because the agent would expe-
rience, unnecessarily, gain-loss utility over the decreasing part of consumption, which is negative on average. Instead
the agent would choose a flat consumption function in this region. In that case, he does not respond to shocks at all,
i.e., his consumption is perfectly excessively smooth and sensitive, which resembles liquidity constraints or adjustment
costs to consumption. As explained in detail by Heidhues and Koszegi (2008), flat consumption implies that beliefs
about consumption are also flat, which generates non-differentiabilities in the agent’s maximization problem, renders
the first-order condition inapplicable, and complicates the equilibrium-finding process. Although this aspect of the
model is undoubtedly interesting, I avoid this problem by restricting myself to monotone consumption functions.
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smooth and sensitive when the agent’s horizon increases because the marginal propensity to con-
sume out of permanent shocks declines when the precautionary-savings motive accumulates.
IV.5 Comparison to the agent’s pre-committed equilibrium
Now, I briefly explain the consumption implications of the monotone-pre-committed equilibrium
that maximizes expected utility by jointly optimizing over consumption and beliefs. Without an
appropriate commitment device, however, the pre-committed equilibrium is not credible because
the agent overconsumes once he wakes up and takes his beliefs as given. I call this phenomenon
beliefs-based present bias because the agent prefers to enjoy the pleasant surprise of increasing
consumption above expectations today instead of increasing both his consumption and expectations
tomorrow.34 Empirically, there is abundant laboratory and field evidence for time-inconsistent
overconsumption, preference reversals, and demand for commitment devices.35 Theoretically, the
hyperbolic-discounting model of Laibson et al. (2012) is very successful in explaining life-cycle
consumption. In the next proposition, I formalize how the consumption implications differ in the
monotone-pre-committed equilibrium if one exists. Then, I explain beliefs-based present bias in
detail and show how it differs from hyperbolic discounting.
Proposition 6. Comparison to the monotone-pre-committed equilibrium.
1. If σPt > 0 for any t, then the monotone-pre-committed consumption path does not correspond
to the monotone-personal equilibrium consumption path.
2. The news-utility agent’s monotone-pre-committed consumption is excessively smooth and sen-
sitive.
3. News-utility preferences introduce a first-order precautionary-savings motive in the monotone-
pre-committed equilibrium, monotone-pre-committed consumption is lower CcT−1 <CT−1, and the




34Koszegi and Rabin (2009) argue in Proposition 6 that the agent overconsumes relative to the optimal pre-
committed path in the presence of uncertainty.
35See, e.g., DellaVigna (2009), Frederick et al. (2002), or Angeletos et al. (2001) for a survey of the theory and
empirical evidence.
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5. The news-utility agent’s monotone-pre-committed consumption path is not characterized by a
drop at retirement.
Suppose that the agent can pre-commit to an optimal, history-dependent consumption path
for each possible future contingency. Then, the agent’s marginal gain-loss utility is no longer
solely composed of the sensation of increasing consumption in that contingency; additionally, the
agent considers that he will experience fewer sensations of gains and more feelings of loss in all
other contingencies. Thus, marginal gain-loss utility has a second component, −u′(CT−1)(η(1−
F t−1Ct (Ct)) + ηλF
t−1
Ct (Ct)), which is negative such that the pre-committed agent consumes less.
Moreover, this negative component dominates if the realization is above the median, i.e., F t−1Ct (Ct)>
0.5. Thus, in the event of good income realizations, pre-committed marginal gain-loss utility is
negative. In contrast, non-pre-committed marginal gain-loss utility is always positive because the
agent enjoys the sensation of increasing consumption in any contingency. Therefore, the degree of
present bias is reference dependent and less strong in the event of bad income realizations, when
increasing consumption is the optimal response even on the pre-committed path. Moreover, this
additional variation in marginal gain-loss utility implies that pre-committed consumption is more
excessively smooth and sensitive.
Beliefs-based present bias is both conceptually different from βδ−preferences and observa-
tionally distinguishable. In particular, there are three main differences between βδ−preferences
and beliefs-based present bias. First, news utility introduces an additional precautionary-savings
motive that is absent in the βδ−model. Second, the news-utility agent does not have a universal de-
sire to pre-commit himself to the standard agent’s consumption path, in contrast to βδ−preferences.
Finally, news utility predicts that the agent’s degree of present bias is reference dependent and
lower in bad times; hence, he behaves better in bad times.
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V QUANTITATIVE PREDICTIONS ABOUT CONSUMPTION
In the following, I assess whether the model’s quantitative predictions match the empirical evi-
dence. Because it is commonly argued that exponential utility is unrealistic, I also present the
numerical implications of a power-utility model, i.e., u(C) = C
1−θ
1−θ , to demonstrate that all of the
predictions hold in model environments that are commonly assumed in the life-cycle consump-
tion literature.36 In Section V.1, I calibrate the two model’s parameters in accordance with the
microeconomic literature and explain each choice in detail. In Section V.3, I employ my own data
to structurally estimate the power-utility model’s parameters and show that the estimates are in
accordance with the existing micro evidence.
V.1 Calibration
The income processes and model environment. For the exponential-utility model, I retain the
normal income process outlined in Section IV assuming that permanent and transitory shocks are
i.i.d., i.e., Yt = Pt−1+ sPt + sTt ∼ N(Pt−1+µP+µT ,σ2P+σ2T ). For the power-utility model, I follow
Carroll (1997) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002), who specify income Yt to be log-normal and
characterized by a deterministic permanent income growth Gt , permanent shocks, and transitory
shocks, which allow for a low probability of unemployment or illness







sTt with probability 1− p and sTt ∼ N(µT ,σ2T )
0 with probability p
 NPt = esPt sPt ∼ N(µP,σ2P).
The life-cycle literature suggests fairly tight ranges for the parameters of the log-normal income
process, which are approximately µT = µP = 0, σT = σP = 0.1, and p≈ 0. I choose the parameters
for the exponential-utility model to roughly generate the volatility of the log-normal income pro-
36The power-utility model cannot be solved analytically, but it can be solved by numerical backward induction,
as shown by Gourinchas and Parker (2002) or Carroll (2001), among others. The numerical solution is illustrated in
greater depth in Appendix B.5.4.
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cess, i.e., µT = µP = 0 and σT = σP = 0.06 because the log-normal variance is e0.5σ
2
(1− e0.5σ2).
Gt typically implies a hump-shaped income profile. Nevertheless, I initially assume that Gt = 1
for all t to highlight the model’s predictions in an environment that does not simply generate a
hump-shaped consumption profile via a hump-shaped income profile. Additionally, I choose the
agent’s horizon T , his retirement period R, his initial wealth A0 and P0, and the interest rate r in
accordance with the life-cycle literature.
The preference parameters. I refer to the literature for the choice of the standard preference
parameters β ≈ 1 and θ ∈ [0.5,4] but discuss the news-utility parameter values, i.e., η , λ , and
γ , in greater detail. In particular, I demonstrate which choices are consistent with existing micro
evidence on risk and time preferences. In Table IV in Appendix A, I illustrate the risk preferences
over gambles with various stakes of the news-utility, standard, and habit-formation agents. In
particular, I calculate the required gain G for a range of losses L to make each agent indifferent
between accepting or rejecting a 50-50 win G or lose L gamble at a wealth level of 300,000 in the
spirit of Rabin (2001) and Chetty and Szeidl (2007).37
First, I want to match risk attitudes towards bets regarding immediate consumption, which are
determined solely by η and λ because it can be reasonably assumed that utility over immediate
consumption is linear. Thus, η = 1 and λ ≈ 2.5 are suggested by the laboratory evidence on loss
aversion over immediate consumption, i.e., the endowment effect literature.38 Of course, when
I assume linear utility over immediate consumption, the standard and habit-formation agents are
37In a canonical asset-pricing model, Pagel (2012) demonstrates that news-utility preferences constitute an addi-
tional step towards resolving the equity-premium puzzle, as they match the historical level and the variation of the
equity premium while simultaneously implying plausible attitudes towards small and large wealth bets.
38For illustration, I borrow a concrete example from Kahneman et al. (1990), in which the authors distribute a good
(mugs or pens) to half of their subjects and ask those who received the good about their willingness to accept (WTA)
and those who did not receive it about their willingness to pay (WTP) if they traded the good. The median WTA is
$5.25, whereas the median WTP is $2.75. Accordingly, I infer (1+η)u(mug) = (1+ηλ )2.25 and (1+ηλ )u(mug) =
(1+η)5.25, which implies that λ ≈ 3 when η ≈ 1. I obtain a similar result for the pen experiment. Unfortunately,
thus far, I can only jointly identify η and λ . If the news-utility agent were only to exhibit gain-loss utility, I would
obtain ηλ2.25 ≈ 5.25 and η2.25 ≈ 2.25, i.e., λ ≈ 2.3 and η ≈ 1 both identified. Alternatively, if I assume that the
market price for mugs (or pens), which is $6 in the experiment (or $3.75), equals (1+η)u(mug) (or (1+η)u(pen)),
then I can estimate η = 0.74 and λ = 2.03 for the mug experiment and η = 1.09 and λ = 2.1 for the pen experiment.
These latter assumptions are reasonable given the induced-market experiments of Kahneman et al. (1990). η = 1 and
λ ≈ 2.5 thus appear to be reasonable choices that are typically used in the literature concerning the static preferences.
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TABLE I:
CALIBRATION OF THE EXPONENTIAL- AND POWER-UTILITY MODELS
Exponential-utility model
µP σP µT σT β r θ η λ γ A0 P0
0 5% 0 7% 0.978 2% 2 1 2 0.75 0 0.1
Power-utility model
µP σP µT σT Gt p β r θ η λ γ h b τ A0P0
0 0.1 −p1−p 0.1 1 0.01 0.97 1% 2 1 2 0.8 0.45 0.8 0.1 0.3
risk neutral. In contrast in Table IV, it can be seen that the news-utility agent’s contemporaneous
gain-loss utility generates reasonable attitudes towards small and large gambles over immediate
consumption. Second, I elicit the agents’ risk attitudes by assuming that each of them is presented
the gamble after all consumption in that period has taken place. The news-utility agent will only
experience prospective gain-loss utility over the gamble’s outcome that is determined by γ . Empir-
ical estimates for the quasi-hyperbolic parameter β in the βδ−model typically range between 0.7
and 0.8 (e.g., Laibson et al. (2012)). Thus, the experimental and field evidence on peoples’ atti-
tudes towards intertemporal consumption trade-offs dictates a choice of b = γ ≈ 0.75 when β ≈ 1.
In Table IV, it can be seen that the news-utility agent’s risk attitudes take reasonable values for
small, medium, and large stakes. The habit-formation agent is risk neutral for small and medium
stakes and somewhat more risk averse for large stakes than the standard agent, who only exhibits
reasonable risk attitudes for very large stakes. For the habit-formation agent, I roughly follow
Michaelides (2002) and choose h = 0.45 to match the excess-sensitivity evidence. The tempted
agent’s additional preference parameter τ = λ
td
1+λ td = 0.1 is chosen according to the estimates of
Bucciol (2012). The calibrations of the exponential-utility and power-utility models can be found
in Table I.
V.2 The model’s quantitative predictions
Excess smoothness and excess sensitivity in consumption. To illustrate the quantitative impli-
cations of excess sensitivity in the exponential-utility model, I run the data-free linear regression
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TABLE II:
EXCESS-SMOOTHNESS AND SENSITIVITY REGRESSION RESULTS
Model news-utility habit standard hyperbolic tempted















coefficient 0.67 0.27 0.69 0.38 0.93 0.01 0.94 0.01 1.01 -0.01
t-statistic 86.7 34.2 141 76.3 187 1.32 205 1.33 135 -1.76
e-s ratio 0.74 0.80 0.95 0.96 1.04
Average results of 200 regressions with N = 200 simulated data points each at normalized wealth
level A0P0 = 1 and date t = 50. The regression results are similar for different wealth levels and
time horizons and nearly identical when I aggregate consumption to then run the regression
instead of averaging the estimates.
of consumption growth on income
∆Ct+1 = α+β1∆Yt+1+β2∆Yt + εt+1.
For the news-utility model, I obtain β1≈ 0.22 and β2≈ 0.18 and a marginal propensity to consume
out of permanent shocks of approximately 71%, whereas the marginal propensity is one for the
standard model.39 To illustrate the exponential-utility model, Figure I displays the consumption
functions for realizations within two standard deviations of each shock, while the other is held
constant. The flatter part of the news-utility consumption function generates excess smoothness
and sensitivity.40
For the power-utility model, I follow Campbell and Deaton (1989) and run the data-free regres-
sion
∆log(Ct+1) = α+β1∆log(Yt+1)+β2∆log(Yt)+ εt+1.
The results are displayed in Table II. In aggregate data, regressing consumption growth on lagged
39Running the regression
∆Ct+1 = α+β1(sPt+1−µP)+β2∆(sPt −µP)+ εt+1
yields β s1 ≈ 1 and β s2 ≈ 0 in the standard model and β1 ≈ 0.71 and β2 ≈ 0.31 in the news-utility model. The transitory
shock introduces a spurious positive correlation between ∆Ct+1 and ∆Yt because ∆Yt+1 = sPt+1 + s
T




40All consumption adjustment takes place after a single period because the agent’s preferences are characterized by
full belief updating. However, the variation in Λt increases end-of-period asset holdings and is thereby spread out over
the entire future. Empirically, Fuhrer (2000) and Reis (2006) find that consumption peaks one year after the shock and
that the consumption response dies out briefly after this delayed response.
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labor income growth, I obtain an OLS estimate for β2 of approximately 0.23 and an excess-
smoothness ratio, i.e., σ(∆log(Ct))σ(∆log(Yt)) as defined in Deaton (1986), of approximately 0.68.
41 In the




σP ≈ 0.95. In addition to the standard and hyperbolic agents, I display re-
sults for internal, multiplicative habit-formation preferences, as assumed in Michaelides (2002),
and temptation-disutility preferences, as developed by Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), following the
specification of Bucciol (2012). The utility specifications can be found in Appendix B.1. Unsur-
prisingly, temptation disutility does not generate excess smoothness and sensitivity, while habit
formation does. However, habit formation appears to generate too little excess smoothness and
too much excess sensitivity and has unrealistic implications for the life-cycle consumption profile,
which I examine next.
The hump-shaped consumption profile. For the exponential-utility model, Figure I displays the
news-utility and standard agent’s lifetime consumption profiles. The figure displays the average
consumption profile of 300 identical agents who encounter different realizations of sPt and s
T
t and
the consumption profile if sPt = 0 and s
P
t = 0 for all t. As can be observed from the figure, the
news-utility agent’s consumption profile is hump shaped. In contrast, the standard agent’s profile
is V-shaped, which demonstrates that exponential utility and a random-walk income process do not
promote the desired hump.
For the power-utility model, Figure II contrasts the five agents’ consumption paths with the
average CEX consumption and income data, which I explain in Section V.3. The habit-formation
agent’s consumption profile is shown only in part because he engages in extremely high wealth ac-
cumulation due to his high effective risk aversion, even if I choose a lower value for h than the one
that fits the excess-sensitivity evidence.42 Hyperbolic-discounting preferences tilt the consump-
tion profile upward at the beginning and downward at the end of life. Temptation disutility causes
severe overconsumption at the beginning of life, which then dies out when alternative consump-
41I follow Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001) and use NIPA deflated total, nondurable, or services consumption and
total disposable labor income for the years 1947 to 2011.
42This result confirms a finding by Michaelides (2002).
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FIGURE I:
EXPONENTIAL-UTILITY CONSUMPTION FUNCTIONS AND LIFE-CYCLE PROFILES
tion opportunities diminish. All of the preference specifications except habit formation generate
a hump-shaped consumption profile. The consumption path of all agents is increasing at the be-
ginning of life because power utility renders them unwilling to borrow; however, all agents are
sufficiently impatient such that consumption eventually decreases.43 However, I argue that the
news-utility agent’s hump looks somewhat nicer with slowly increasing consumption at the begin-
ning of life and decreasing consumption shortly before retirement.
43Because power utility eliminates the possibility of negative or zero consumption and because of the small pos-
sibility of zero income in all future periods, the agents will never find it optimal to borrow. Moreover, power utility
implies prudence such that all agents have a standard precautionary-savings motive. However, this motive is rather
weak because the standard agent’s consumption begins to decrease rather early in life. Moreover, in a model with
only transitory shocks and no zero-income state, the precautionary savings motive is so weak that the standard agent’s
consumption is flat throughout. Attanasio (1999) criticizes this weak motive as lacking realism.
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FIGURE II:
POWER-UTILITY LIFE-CYCLE PROFILES AND CEX CONSUMPTION AND INCOME DATA
The drop in consumption at retirement. For the exponential-utility model, Figure I shows a
substantial drop in consumption at retirement. Such a drop can also be observed in Figure II for
both the power-utility model and the CEX consumption data. Thus, I conclude that the news-utility
agent’s lifetime consumption profile looks very similar to the average consumption profile from the
CEX data, which I explain in greater detail in the next section.
V.3 Structural estimation
CEX data. I structurally estimate the news-utility parameters following Gourinchas and Parker
(2002). I use data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the years 1980 to 2002 as
provided by the NBER. I generate a pseudo panel, which averages individual observations at each
age, because the CEX does not survey households consecutively. To control for cohort, family
size, and time effects, I employ average cohort techniques (see, e.g., Verbeek (2007), Attanasio
(1998), and Deaton (1985)) and a fifth-order polynomial methodology. Because cohort and time
effects are not separately identifiable, I proxy time effects with the regional unemployment rate. I
deflate the data to 1984 dollars and assume that all agents retire at 68 and die after age 78. Figure
II displays the average empirical income and average empirical consumption profiles.
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Identification. Theoretically, the functional form of Λt , or the agent’s first-order condition in the
power-utility model, implies that news utility introduces such specific variation in consumption
growth that all preference parameters are identified in the finite-horizon model, i.e., η , λ , γ , β , and
θ , because the Jacobian has full rank.44 Roughly speaking, the shape of the consumption profile
identifies β and θ . Because consumption tracks income too closely and peaks too early in the
standard model, η > 0 and λ > 1 can be identified. Finally, the drop in consumption at retirement
identifies γ < 1.
Structural estimation results. I employ a two-stage method-of-simulated-moments procedure.
In the first stage, I estimate all of the structural parameters governing the environment µˆP, σˆP,
µˆT , σˆT , pˆ, Gˆ, rˆ, aˆ0, Rˆ, and Tˆ and estimate µˆP = −0.002, µˆT = −0.0031, σˆP = 0.18, σˆT = 0.16,
and pˆ = 0.0031 in accordance with the literature. The mean of Moody’s municipal bond index
is r = 3.1%. Moreover, because 25 is chosen as the beginning of life by Gourinchas and Parker
(2002), 68 is the average retirement age in the US according to the OECD, and 78 is the average
life expectancy in the US according to the UN list, I choose Rˆ = 11 and Tˆ = 54. At age 25, I
estimate the mean ratio of liquid wealth to income as 0.0096 under the assumption that P0 = 1. In
the second stage, I estimate the preference parameters β , θ , η , λ , and γ and obtain θˆ = 0.79, βˆ =
0.97, ηˆ = 1.1, λˆ = 2.4, and γˆ = 0.53.45 I display all first- and second-stage structural parameter
estimates in Table III.46 The preference parameters are estimated very tightly, and I cannot reject
the overidentification test, which is a surprisingly positive result given the number of moments T
44Numerically, I confirm this result in a Monte Carlo simulation and estimation exercise. Moreover, because previ-
ous studies cannot separately identify η and λ , I confirm that I obtain similar estimates when I assume η = 1 and only
estimate the other parameters.
45I estimate the second stage as follows. Let lnC˜a = 1na ∑
na
c=1 ln(C˜i,a) be the average consumption at each age
a ∈ [25,78] across all observations i, with ln(C˜i,a) being the household consumption data uncontaminated by cohort,
time, number of earners, and family size effects. I minimize the sum of squares of the 65 data points lnC˜a and the
simulated equivalent lnC˜a(β ,θ ,λ ,γ, Ξˆ), which depends on the parameters β , θ , η , λ , and γ and the estimated first-
stage parameters Ξˆ. I use a Nelder-Mead minimization algorithm with an optimal weighting matrix, i.e., the inverse
of the variance of each point of lnC˜a. I obtain standard errors by numerically estimating the gradient of the moment
function at its optimum neglecting first-stage estimation errors for the present.
46Alternatively, I use a more complex set of moments to estimate the preference parameters, namely the degree of
excess smoothness in consumption, the extent of the drop in consumption at retirement, and four other points of the




FIRST-STAGE PARAMETER ESTIMATION RESULTS
µˆP σˆP µˆT σˆT pˆ Gˆt rˆ P0 Aˆ0Pˆ0 Rˆ Tˆ
0 0.19 0 0.15 0.0031 eYt+1−Yt 3.1% 1 0.0096 11 54
SECOND-STAGE PARAMETER ESTIMATION RESULTS
news-utility model standard model
βˆ θˆ ηˆ λˆ γˆ βˆ θˆ
estimate 0.97 0.77 0.97 2.33 0.59 0.9 2.01
standard error (0.0002) (0.007) (0.039) (0.006) (0.008) (0.0035) (0.079)
χ(·) 9.74 75.7
The overidentification test’s critical value at 5% is 67.5.
and the number of parameters, which is only five. In contrast, for the standard model, the standard
errors are considerably larger and I reject the overidentification test, as do Gourinchas and Parker
(2002). Finally, although I am hesitant to overinterpret this evidence, I obtain suggestive evidence
for one of the new comparative statics generated by news utility; the excess-smoothness ratio in
the CEX data increases from 0.68 at age 25 to 0.82 at the start of retirement.47
VI EXTENSIONS AND WELFARE
In the following, I briefly outline three extensions of the basic life-cycle model that I have devel-
oped separately and the preferences’ welfare implications.
Extensions. As a first extension, I introduce both illiquid savings and credit-card borrowing to
demonstrate that the beliefs-based time inconsistency generates simultaneous demand for illiquid
retirement savings and excessive credit-card borrowing. I assume that the agent can borrow against
his illiquid savings up to his natural48 borrowing constraint, which is determined by the discounted
47For comparison, Figure III in Appendix A displays the consumption and income data of Gourinchas and Parker
(2002) as well as the authors’ fitted consumption profile (i.e. the standard model) and the fitted consumption of the
news-utility model using the authors’ baseline estimation results, which are displayed in Table V in Appendix A, as
well as η = 1 , λ = 2 , and γ = 0.85 for the news-utility model. As noted by Gourinchas and Parker (2002), the
standard agent’s consumption peaks somewhat too early and increases too steeply with income growth. News utility
causes consumption to peak later and to increase less steeply at the beginning of life.
48Following Carroll (2001), I call this borrowing constraint natural because power utility and the possibility of zero
income in all future periods induce the agent to never want to borrow beyond this constraint.
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value of his accumulated illiquid savings. I again find that only the news-utility model is able to
robustly generate the collection of life-cycle consumption facts. My findings differ from those of
Laibson et al. (2012) because I do not assume the existence of non-natural borrowing constraints.
Absent such constraints, only those hyperbolic agents at the margin of zero liquid asset holdings
would delay consumption adjustments to shocks or tolerate a drop in consumption at retirement.
As a second extension, I let the agent endogenously determine his work hours in response to
fluctuations in wages. In the event of an adverse shock, he can maintain high consumption by
working more instead of consuming his savings. Thus, if the agent’s labor supply is relatively
elastic, his consumption becomes more excessively smooth and less excessively sensitive.
As a third extension, I allow the agent to invest in a risky asset in addition to his risk-free asset.
I obtain three main implications for portfolio choice. First, the agent chooses a low portfolio share
or does not participate in the stock market, as he is first-order risk averse. Second, his optimal
portfolio share decreases in the return realization. In the event of a bad return realization, the agent
chooses a higher portfolio share to avoid realizing all of the feelings of loss associated with future
consumption. Third, the agent exhibits a time-inconsistency for risk. Given his beliefs, the agent
is inclined to opt for a positive surprise with additional risk to enjoy the prospect of high future
consumption, as he resides on a low-risk path. All of these predictions smooth the agent’s risky
asset holdings relative to the standard model. Thus, I obtain a novel prediction of stickiness in
portfolio choice, which has been observed in household portfolio data by Calvet et al. (2009) or
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008).
Welfare. Beyond the observation that the news-utility agent is unable to follow his expected-
utility maximizing path, the news-utility implications for welfare and the costs of business cycle
fluctuations differ from those of the standard model. In Section IV, I demonstrate that income
uncertainty has a first-order effect on savings and thus welfare in the news-utility model; i.e., the
news-utility agent dislikes fluctuations in consumption much more than the standard agent. In the
spirit of Lucas (1978), I compute the share λW of initial wealth A1 that the agent would be willing
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to give up for a risk-free consumption path. In the power-utility model for the calibration given in
Table I, I obtain a share of approximately 47.83% for the news-utility agent, whereas the standard
agent’s share is 8.65%.
VII CONCLUSION
This paper demonstrates that expectations-based reference-dependent preferences can not only ex-
plain micro evidence, such as the endowment effect or consumer pricing and promotions, but they
can also provide a unified explanation for three major life-cycle consumption facts. Loss aver-
sion, a robust risk preference analyzed in experimental research and a popular explanation for
the equity premium puzzle, generates excess smoothness and sensitivity in consumption, two of
the most widely analyzed macro consumption puzzles. Intuitively, the agent wants to allow his
expectations-based reference point to decrease or increase prior to adjusting consumption. More-
over, the interplay of news-utility risk and time preferences generate other predictions that are
consistent with the evidence: a hump-shaped consumption profile and a drop in consumption at
retirement, the first of which results from the net of two preference features. Loss aversion gener-
ates an additional precautionary-savings motive, which accumulates more rapidly than the standard
precautionary-savings motive in the agent’s horizon. Thus, the news-utility agent’s consumption
path is steeper at the beginning of life. But, the expectations-based reference point introduces what
I term beliefs-based present bias: expected utility is higher on an optimal pre-committed consump-
tion path in which the agent simultaneously optimizes over consumption and beliefs. Lacking
an appropriate commitment device, however, the pre-committed path is non-feasible because the
agent would deviate when taking his beliefs as given. Time consistency in equilibrium induces the
agent to choose an overconsumption equilibrium path relative to the pre-committed one. However,
once the retirement period begins, time-inconsistent overconsumption is associated with a certain
loss in future consumption. Thus, the agent is suddenly able to behave himself, and the consump-
tion path exhibits a drop at retirement. I explore the intuition for the model’s results in depth by
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solving an exponential-utility model in closed form in addition to numerically solving the standard
life-cycle model. Moreover, I structurally estimate the model and obtain news-utility preference
parameter estimates in line with the existing micro evidence.
In the future, I wish to further explore expectations-based reference dependence as a potential
micro foundation for behavioral biases that have been widely documented. For instance, all of
my life-cycle results support the notion that fluctuations in beliefs about consumption are painful.
If people have some discretion in choosing how much information to gather, they might choose
to “stick their head into the sand” occasionally to avoid fluctuations in beliefs that are painful on
average; i.e., people are myopically loss averse. For instance, a long-term investor might choose
to not check on his portfolio, particularly when he suspects that it might have decreased in value;
this behavior has been termed the ostrich effect. Similarly, a CEO might choose to not evaluate a
project when he suspects that it is performing poorly. An outsider, who acquires all information
he does not have a stake in, will perceive the investor’s or CEO’s behavior as overconfident and
extrapolative because their expectations are based on an overly favorable and outdated information
set whenever they have received adverse but only incomplete information.
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A MORE FIGURES AND TABLES
TABLE IV:
RISK ATTITUDES OVER SMALL AND LARGE WEALTH BETS
standard news-utility habit-formation
Loss (L) contemp. prospective
10 10 15 22 10
200 200 300 435 200
1000 1000 1500 2166 1000
5000 5000 7500 10719 5000
50000 50291 75000 105487 52502
100000 100406 150000 2066770 112040
For each loss L, the table’s entries show the required gain G to make each agent indifferent between
accepting and rejecting a 50-50 gamble win G or lose L at a wealth level of 300,000 and a permanent
income of 100,000 (power-utility model).
TABLE V:
BASELINE ESTIMATION RESULTS OF GOURINCHAS AND PARKER (2002)





0.0212 0.00302 0.0344 0.9598 0.514 0.0701 0.071 1 0.3 40
FIGURE III:
CONSUMPTION AND INCOME PROFILES AND THE FITTED MODEL’S CONSUMPTION
FROM GOURINCHAS AND PARKER (2002)
The news-utility consumption follows the same specification except for the choice of news-utility
parameters η = 1, λ = 2, and γ = 0.85.
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B DERIVATIONS AND PROOFS
B.1 Summary of utility functions under consideration
I briefly summarize the lifetime utility of all preference specifications that I consider. I define
the “news-utility” agent’s lifetime utility in each period t = {0, ...,T} as









with β ∈ [0,1], u(·) a HARA49 utility function, η ∈ (0,∞), λ ∈ (1,∞), and γ ∈ [0,1]. Additionally,
I first consider standard preferences as analyzed by Carroll (2001), Gourinchas and Parker (2002),






Second, I consider internal, multiplicative habit-formation preferences as assumed in Michaelides






with h ∈ [0,1].
Third, I consider βδ− or hyperbolic-discounting preferences as developed by Laibson (1997).






with b ∈ [0,1] corresponding to the βδ−agent’s β .
Fourth, I consider temptation-disutility preferences as developed by Gul and Pesendorfer (2004)
following the specification of Bucciol (2012). The “tempted” agent’s lifetime utility is given by





with C˜tdt being the most tempting alternative consumption level and λ td ∈ [0,∞).
49A utility function u(c) is said to exhibit hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) if the level of risk tolerance,
− u′′(c)u′(c) is a linear function of c.
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B.2 Derivation of the exponential-utility model
B.2.1 The finite-horizon model
A simple derivation of the second-to-last period can be found in the text. The exponential-
utility model can be solved through backward induction. In the following, I outline the model’s
solution for period T − i in which the agent chooses how much to consume CT−i and how much to

































and f (i) =∑ij=0(1+r) j = (1+r)i
1+r−( 11+r )i
r (in the text a(i) =
f (i−1)
f (i) ). Then, the budget constraint











ΛT−i is a function independent of AT−i−1 and PT−i−1 but dependent on sPT−i and sTT−i. In the last
period the agent consumes everything such that ΛT = 0. As a first step to verify the solution guess,





























QT−i−1 is a constant if ΛT−i depends only on sPT−i and sTT−i. To derive the above sum, I simply
































The consumption function and it’s sum allows me to write down the agent’s continuation utility in











































The above expression for ψT−i−1 can be easily inferred from the agent’s utility function. The first
component in ψT−i−1 corresponds to the expectation of consumption utility in period T − i, the
second to contemporaneous gain-loss in period T − i, the third to prospective gain-loss in period
T − i that depends on the sum of future consumption utilities QT−i, and the last to the agent’s












































if λ > 1, η > 0, and g′(·)< 0. The above consideration implies that ψT−i−1 > QT−i−1 necessarily
if θ > 0 such that u(·) is concave. Now, I turn to the agent’s maximization problem in period T − i,








I want to find the agent’s first-order condition. I begin by explaining the first derivative of con-
temporaneous gain-loss utility n(CT−i,FT−i−1CT−i ). The agent takes his beliefs about period T − i
49



















the last step results from the guessed consumption function and the assumption that admissi-
ble consumption functions are increasing in both shocks. Here, I abuse notation somewhat by






(·). The first derivative of the agent’s prospective gain-loss utility
∑iτ=1β τn(F
T−i,T−i−1
CT−i+τ ) over the entire stream of future consumption utilities u(PT−i+
(1+r)i
f (i−1)AT−i)QT−i
can be inferred in a similar manner. Recall that QT−i is a constant under the guessed consumption
function; thus, the agent only experiences gain-loss utility over the realized uncertainty in period















































T−i) results from the solution guess for AT−i times
(1+r)i
f (i−1) and the fact
that future admissible consumption is increasing in both shocks. The derivative of the agent’s





In turn, in any period T − i the news-utility agent’s first-order condition (normalized by PT−i) is
given by






















The first-order condition can be rewritten to obtain the optimal consumption and end-of-period
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and the guessed consumption function can be verified.
B.2.2 The infinite-horizon model
Suppose σPt =σP and σTt =σT for all t and T, i→∞. I use a simple guess and verify procedure
to find the infinite-horizon recursive equilibrium; alternatively, the solution can be obtained by
simple backward induction taking T and i to infinity. The infinite-horizon model consumption and
asset-holding functions are given by
Ct = Yt + rAt−1− 11+ r s
T
t −Λt = Pt−1+ sPt + rAt−1+
r
1+ r




The first-order condition normalized by Pt is given by
exp{−θ(1+ r)At−1−θsTt +θAt}(1+ηF(sPt +
r
1+ r




= rexp{−θrAt}(ψ+ γQ(ηF(sPt +
r
1+ r












ψ+ γQ(ηF(sPt + r1+r s
T
t )+ηλ (1−F(sPt + r1+r sTt )))
1+ηF(sPt + r1+r s
T




Consumption is then determined by the budget constraint
Ct = Yt + rAt−1− 11+ r s
T




Q and ψ are constant in an i.i.d. environment and given by
Q =
βEt [exp{−θ(sPt+1+ r1+r sTt+1−Λt+1)}]
1−βEt [exp{−θ(sPt+1+ r1+r sTt+1+ rΛt+1)}]
ψ =
βEt [exp{−θ(sPt+1+ r1+r sTt+1−Λt+1)}+ω(exp{−θ(sPt+1+ r1+r sTt+1−Λt+1)})+ γQω(exp{−θ(sPt+1+ r1+r sTt+1+ rΛt+1)})]
1−βEt [exp{−θ(sPt+1+ r1+r sTt+1+ rΛt+1)}]
.
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B.2.3 The optimal pre-committed equilibrium
Suppose the agent has the ability to pick an optimal history-dependent consumption path for
each possible future contingency in period zero when he does not experience any gain-loss utility.
Thus, in period zero the agent chooses optimal consumption in period t in each possible contin-
gency jointly with his beliefs, which of course coincide with the agent’s optimal state-contingent
plan. For instance, consider the joint optimization over consumption and beliefs for C(Y ∗) when













{(u(C(Y ))−u(C(Y ′)))dFY (Y ′)+ηλ
ˆ ∞
Y
(u(C(Y ))−u(C(Y ′)))dFY (Y ′)}dFY (Y )
= u′(C(Y ∗))(ηFY (Y ∗)+ηλ (1−FY (Y ∗)))−u′(C(Y ∗))(η(1−FY (Y ∗))+ηλFY (Y ∗))
= u′(C(Y ∗))η(λ −1)(1−2FY (Y ∗)) with η(λ −1)(1−2FY (Y ∗))> 0 for FY (Y ∗)< 0.5.
Consider the difference to the term in the initial first-order condition u′(Ct)(ηF t−1Ct (Ct)+ηλ (1−
F t−1Ct (Ct))): when choosing the pre-committed plan the additional utility of increasing consump-
tion a little bit is no longer only made up of the additional step in the probability distribution;
instead the two additional negative terms consider that in all other states of the world the agent
experiences less gain feelings and more loss feelings because of increasing consumption in that
contingency. The equation says that the marginal utility of state Y ∗ will be increased by news
utility if the realization is below the median. For realizations above the median the marginal utility
will be decreased and the agent will consume relatively less.
Unfortunately there is a problem arising in the pre-commitment optimization problem that
has been absent in the non-pre-committed one: When beliefs are taken as given the agent opti-
mizes over two concave functions consumption utility and the first part of gain-loss utility, ac-
cordingly the first-order condition pins down a maximum. In contrast, when the agent chooses his
beliefs simultaneously to his consumption additionally the second convex part of gain-loss utility
is optimized over. The additional part determining marginal utility −u′(Ct)(η(1−F t−1Ct (Ct)))+
ηλF t−1Ct (Ct))) is largest for particular good income realizations, since increasing consumption in
these states implies additional loss feelings in almost all other states of the world. It can be eas-
ily shown that the sufficient condition of the optimization problem holds if the parameters satisfy
following simple condition: η(λ −1)(2F t−1Ct (Ct)−1)< 1. Accordingly, for η(λ −1)< 1, which
is true for a range of commonly used parameter combinations, the first-order condition pins down
the optimum.
From the above consideration it can be easily inferred that the optimal pre-committed con-

































































B.3 The other agent’s exponential-utility consumption functions
By the same arguments as for the derivation of the news-utility model, the “standard” agent’s
























































ψs = Qs =
βEt [exp{−θ(sPt+1+ r1+r sTt+1−Λs)}]
1−βEt [exp{−θ(sPt+1+ r1+r sTt+1+ rΛs)}]









The “tempted” agent’s maximization problem is given by
maxCtdt {u(C
td





with C˜tdt+τ being the most tempting alternative. In period T as the agent cannot die in debt the most
tempting alternative is C˜tdT = X
td
T but the agent will consume XT anyway thus temptation disutility
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is zero and QtdT−1 = Q
s































T−1 = βET−1[exp{−θ(sPT + sTT )}].
What’s the agent’s most tempting alternative in period T −1? The value of cash-on-hand is X tdT−1
but the most tempting alternative is C˜tdT → ∞ as consumption could be negative in the last period
CT → −∞, which would yield limCtdT →−∞u(C
td
T ) = limCtdT →−∞−
1
θ e
−θCtdT → −∞. Accordingly,
QtdT−2 enters limC˜tdT →−∞u












































































































βEt [exp{−θ(sPt+1+ r1+r sTt+1−Λtd)}(1−λ td)]
1−βEt [exp{−θ(sPt+1+ r1+r sTt+1+ rΛtd)}]
.
54

































































βEt [exp{−θ(sPt+1+ r1+r sTt+1−Λb)}]
1−βEt [exp{−θ(sPt+1+ r1+r sTt+1+ rΛb)}]
.
B.4 Proofs of Section IV:
B.4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
If the consumption function derived in Section B.2.1 belongs to the class of admissible con-
sumption functions then the equilibrium exists and is unique as the equilibrium solution is obtained
by maximizing the agent’s objective function, which is globally concave, and there is a finite pe-
riod that uniquely determines the equilibrium. Please refer to Section B.2.1 for the derivation of
the consumption function. σ∗t is implicitly defined by the two admissible consumption function
restrictions ∂CT−i∂ sPT−i






the restrictions are equivalent to ∂a(i)ΛT−i∂ sPT−i
< 1 and ∂a(i)ΛT−i∂ sTT−i




ψT−i > γQT−i (for any concave utility function which I have shown in Section B.2)). Recall that
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a(i) = 1− (1+r)if (i) =
f (i−1)
f (i) . Then, σ
∗
























































































there exists a condition σ2Pt+(
(1+r)i
f (i) )
2σ2Tt ≥σ∗t for all t which ensures that an admissible consump-
tion function exists that uniquely determines the equilibrium (given the admissible consumption
functions in each future period until the final period) because the optimization problem is globally
concave.
B.4.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Please refer to the derivation of the exponential-utility model Section B.2 for a detailed deriva-
tion of ΛT−i. According to Definition 5 consumption is excessively smooth if ∂Ct∂ sPt < 1 and exces-
sively sensitive if ∂∆Ct+1∂ sPt
> 0. Consumption growth is
∆CT−i = sPT−i+(1−a(i))sTT−i−a(i)ΛT−i+ΛT−i−1
so that ∂CT−i∂ sPT−i
< 1 iff ∂ΛT−i∂ sPT−i
> 0 and ∂∆CT−i∂ sPT−i−1
> 0 iff ∂ΛT−i−1∂ sPT−i−1
> 0. Since ψT−i > γQT−i (for any






































The same holds true for the infinite-horizon model
∆Ct = sPt +
r
1+ r
sTt −Λt +(1+ r)Λt−1
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1+ηF(sPt + r1+r s
T
t )+ηλ (1−F(sPt + r1+r sTt ))
ψ+ γQ(ηF(sPt + r1+r s
T
t )+ηλ (1−F(sPt + r1+r sTt )))
> 0.
Accordingly, ∂Λt∂ sPt
> 0 as ψ > γQ. Thus, if sPt ↑ then Λt ↑ and the shock induced change in con-
sumption is less than one and the period t shock induced change in one-period ahead consumption
∆Ct+1 is larger than zero.





0 for all t such that consumption is neither excessively sensitive nor excessively smooth.
B.4.3 Proof of Lemma 1
I start with the first part of the lemma, the precautionary-savings motive. In the second-to-last
period of the simple model outlined in the text, the first-order condition is given by
u′(CT−1)+u′(CT−1)(ηFP(sPT−1)+ηλ (1−FP(sPT−1))))
= (1+ r)u′((sPT−1−CT−1)(1+ r)+ sPT−1)γ βET−1[u′(SPT )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
QT−1
(ηFP(sPT−1)+ηλ (1−FP(sPT−1)))
+(1+ r)u′((sPT−1−CT−1)(1+ r)+ sPT−1)βET−1[u′(SPT )+η(λ −1)
ˆ ∞
SPT
(u′(SPT )−u′(y))dFP(y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψT−1
.
From Section B.2 I know that ψT−1 > QT−1 because for any two random variables X ∼ FX and














if λ > 1, η > 0, and g′(·)< 0. Thus, βET−1[η(λ −1)
´ ∞
SPT
(u′(SPT )−u′(y))dFP(y)]> 0 if u′′(·)> 0











∂λ > 0. Then, for any value of savings AT−1 = s
P
T−1−CT−1
the right hand side of the first-order condition is increased by the presence of expected gain-
loss disutility if σP > 0 whereas if σP = 0 then ψT−1 = QT−1. The increase of the agent’s
marginal value of savings by the presence of expected gain-loss disutility depends on σP > 0,





|σP=0 > 0 as can be easily shown for any normally distribution random variable
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{−z+ zF01(z)+F01(−z)}dF01(z)≈ e−θµθη(λ −1)0.7832 > 0.
Thus, news-utility introduces a first-order precautionary-savings motive.
In the second part of the lemma the implications for consumption can be immediately seen by
comparing the agents’ first-order conditions. The standard agent’s first-order condition in period
T −1 is given by
u′(CT−1) = Ru′((sPT−1−CT−1)R+ sPT−1)QT−1.







for γ high enough such that the news-utility agent consumes less than the standard agent if he does
not discount prospective gain-loss utility very highly. Moreover, as ψT−1QT−1 is increasing in σP the
threshold value for γ , i.e., γ¯ , in each comparison is decreasing in σP.
B.4.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The agent optimally chooses consumption and asset holdings in periods T − i= 1, ...,T for any
horizon T . I defined a hump-shaped consumption profile as characterized by increasing consump-
tion and asset holdings in the beginning of life C1 <C2 and decreasing consumption in the end of
life CT <CT−1 (note that, I derive the thresholds σP and σP for sPt = 0 and sTt = 0 in all periods,
since ΛT−i is skewed this is not exactly the average consumption path but the difference is minor).
The first characteristic requires C1 <C2 which implies that
(1+ r)T−1
f (T −1) (1+ r)A0+P0−
f (T −2)
f (T −1)Λ1 <
(1+ r)T−2
f (T −2) (1+ r)A1+P0−
f (T −3)
f (T −2)Λ2
so that Λ1 >
f (T−3)
f (T−2)Λ2 and since
f (T−3)
f (T−2) < 1 this holds always if Λ1 > 0 as T becomes large since
in the limit Λ1 = Λ2. Recall that if λ > 1 and η > 0 then ψT−i > QT−i, ψT−i > ψT−i+1 and
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QT−i > QT−i+1 and ψT−i−QT−i > ψT−i+1−QT−i+1 for all i and ψT−iQT−i approaches it’s limit
ψ
Q as








1− ( 11+r )T−1
ψ1+ γQ1η 12(1+λ )
1+η 12(1+λ )
> 1.
Accordingly, if ψ1Q1 (which is determined by expected marginal gain-loss utility) is large enough
relative to γ the agent chooses an increasing consumption path. For T → ∞ the condition boils
down to
r
ψ+ γQη 12(1+λ )
1+η 12(1+λ )






for which a sufficient condition is γQ > 1r .




(1+ r)AT−2− 12+ rΛT−1




ψT−1+ γQT−1η 12(1+λ )
1+η 12(1+λ )





Note that, because β (1+ r) ≈ 1 the standard agent will choose an almost flat consumption path
such that (1+ r)QT−1 ≈ 1. Thus, the news-utility agent chooses a mean falling consumption path
in the end of life as long as ψT−1QT−1 is not too large or γ is not too close to one.
B.4.5 Proof of Proposition 4
In the deterministic setting, sPt = s
T
t = 0 for all t such that the news-utility agent will not
experience actual news utility in a subgame-perfect equilibrium because he cannot fool himself
and thus ψt = Qt for all t. Thus, the expected-utility maximizing path corresponds to the standard
agent’s one which is determined in any period T − i by the following first-order condition







If the agent believes he follows the above path then the consistency constraint (increasing con-
sumption is not preferred) has to hold







Thus, if η < γηλ ⇒ γ > 1λ the agent follows the expected-utility maximizing path. Whereas
for γ ≤ 1λ news-utility consumption is characterized by equality of the consistency constraint,
because the agent will choose the lowest consumption level that just satisfies it. Then, the first-
order condition becomes equivalent to a βδ−agent’s first-order condition with b = 1+γηλ1+η < 1.
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In the infinite-horizon model, a simple perturbation argument gives the following consistency
constraint
exp(−θ(1+ r)At−1+θAt)(1+η)< rexp(−θrAt)Q(1+ γηλ ),
because ψ = Q. However, if γ > 1λ the news-utility agent finds it optimal to follow the expected-
utility-maximizing standard agent’s path




log(rQs) with Qs =
βexp(−θ(−Λs))
1−βexp(−θrΛs) .
Whereas for γ ≤ 1λ news-utility consumption will choose the lowest consumption level that just sat-
isfies his consistency constraint. Then, the first-order condition becomes equivalent to a βδ−agent’s
first-order condition with b = 1+γηλ1+η < 1.
B.4.6 Proof of Proposition 5
I say that the news-utility agent’s consumption path features a drop in consumption at retire-
ment, if the change in consumption at retirement is negative and smaller than it is after the start of
retirement, i.e., ∆CT−R is negative and smaller than ∆CT−R+1. In general, after the start of retire-
ment the news-utility agent’s consumption growth follows the standard model or the hyperbolic-
discounting model. Thus, the news-utility agent’s implied hyperbolic-discount factor after retire-
ment is bR ∈ {1+γηλ1+η ,1}, which is larger than the news-utility agent’s implied hyperbolic-discount
factor at retirement. In the at-retirement period the weight on future marginal value versus cur-
rent marginal consumption is between {1+γηλ1+ηλ , 1+γη1+η } and since 1+γηλ1+ηλ < 1+γη1+η < 1+γηλ1+η < 1 the
hyperbolic-discount factor implied by at-retirement consumption growth is necessarily lower than
the hyperbolic-discount factor implied by post-retirement consumption growth. Thus, consump-
tion growth at retirement will necessarily be less than consumption growth after retirement. More-
over, if consumption growth after retirement is approximately zero, because log((1+ r)β ) ∈ [− M
,M] with M small then consumption growth at retirement will be negative.
Let me formalize the agent’s consumption growth at and after retirement. After retirement the
news-utility agent’s consumption growth is ∆CT−R+1 = CT−R+1−CT−R = −a(R− 1)ΛT−R+1 +
ΛT−R and will correspond to a hyperbolic-discounting agent’s consumption with b ∈ {1+ηγλ1+η ,1}
such that the agent’s continuation utilities in period T −R and T −R+1 (which determine ΛT−R
and ΛT−R+1) correspond to



















thus if log((1+r)β )∈ [−M,M] with M small then consumption growth after retirement will be ap-
proximately zero (if b= 1 and the news-utility agent follows the standard agent’s path) or negative
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if b < 1 (if the news-utility agent follows a hyperbolic-discounting path but log((1+ r)β ) ≈ 0)).
Consumption growth at retirement is ∆CT−R =CT−R−CT−R−1 = −a(R)ΛT−R +ΛT−R−1. ΛT−R
will correspond to a hyperbolic-discounting agent’s value with b ∈ {1+ηγλ1+η ,1} as above. But,
ΛT−R−1 will correspond to a hyperbolic-discounting agent’s value with b ∈ {1+γηλ1+ηλ , 1+γη1+η } and it













and if the news-utility agent would continue this hyperbolic path implied by the past retirement


































with ψT−R−1 = QT−R−1 = QbT−R−1 because there is no uncertainty from period T −R on. As can
























for instance, if F(·) = 0.5 then 1+γ 12η(1+λ )
1+ 12η(1+λ )
< 1 iff γ < 1. Thus, news-utility consumption growth
is smaller at retirement than after retirement. Moreover, it is negative because it is either approxi-
mately zero after retirement (if bR = 1) or negative after retirement (if bR = 1+γηλ1+η < 1).
B.4.7 Proof of Corollary 1
After retirement the news-utility agent’s consumption from period T−R on will correspond to a
hyperbolic-discounting agent’s consumption with b∈{1+ηγλ1+η ,1} such that the agent’s continuation
utilities correspond to
QT−R−1 = ψT−R−1 = QbT−R−1


























as can be easily seen iff γ < 1 then ∂ΛT−R−1∂ sPT−R−1
> 0 and consumption is excessively smooth and
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sensitive in the pre-retirement period.
B.4.8 Proofs of the new predictions about consumption (Section IV.4)
The new predictions can be easily inferred from the above considerations.
1. Consumption is more excessively sensitive for permanent than for transitory shocks in an en-
vironment with permanent shocks. In an environment with transitory shocks only, however,
news-utility consumption is excessively sensitive with respect to transitory shocks. Λt varies
more with the permanent shock than with the transitory shock, because the agent is consum-
ing only the per-period value r1+r s
T
t of the period t transitory shock, such that F
t−1
Ct (Ct) varies
little with sTt . However, in the absence of permanent shocks Λt would vary with FSTT−i(s
T
T−i)
which fully determines F t−1Ct (Ct) even though consumption itself will increase only by the
per-period value r1+r s
T
t of the transitory shock. Thus, consumption is excessively sensitive
for transitory shocks when permanent shocks are absent. With permanent shocks, however,
consumption is excessively sensitive for transitory shocks only when the horizon is very











T−i) despite the fact that it is discounted by
(1+r)i
f (i) .
2. The degree of excess smoothness and sensitivity is decreasing in the amount of economic
uncertainty σP. If σP is small, the agent’s beliefs change more quickly relative to the change
in the realization of the shock; hence, the consumption function is more flat for realizations

























is very high at sPT−i = µP






is a very narrow distribution, i.e., σP is small.
3. Any bell-shaped shock distribution induces the variation in ΛT−i and thereby the amount
of excess sensitivity to be bounded. If the agent is hit by an extreme shock, the actual
value of the low probability realization matters less because neighboring states have very









bounded if the two shocks’ distributions are bell shaped. Thus, the variation in ΛT−i is
bounded.
4. Consumption is more excessively sensitive and excessively smooth when the agent’s horizon
increases, because the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent shocks declines
when the additional precautionary-savings motive accumulates. ψT−iQT−i is increasing in i and
approaches a constant ψQ when T →∞ and i→∞. Then, the variation in ΛT−i is increasing in
i. And since consumption growth ∆CT−i is determined by −a(i)ΛT−i+ΛT−i−1 on average
the larger variation in ΛT−i translates into a higher coefficient in the OLS regression. This
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As a(i) = f (i−1)f (i) is increasing in i because f (i) = ∑
i
j=0(1+ r)
j and thus (a(i))
2
1−a(i) is increasing
in i and approaching a constant and ψT−iQT−i is increasing in i and approaching a constant it
can be easily seen that ∂a(i)ΛT−i∂ sPT−i
is increasing in i which means that consumption becomes
more excessively smooth as the agent’s horizon increases. Moreover, as a(i)1−a(i) is increasing
in i too ∂ΛT−i∂ sPT−i
is increasing in i which means that consumption becomes more excessively
sensitive as the agent’s horizon increases.
B.4.9 Proof of Proposition 6
In the following, I assume that the following parameter condition (which ensures that the
agent’s maximization problem is globally concave) holds η(λ − 1) < 1. All of the following
proofs are direct applications of the prior proofs for the monotone-personal equilibrium just using
ΛcT−i instead of ΛT−i. Thus, I make the exposition somewhat shorter.
1. The personal and pre-committed consumption functions are different in each period as can
be seen in Section B.2. But, if there’s no uncertainty and γ > 1λ then the personal and
pre-committed consumption functions both correspond to the standard agent’s consumption
function as shown in the proof of Proposition 4.
2. Please refer to the derivation of the exponential-utility pre-committed model in Section B.2


































































Thus, optimal pre-committed consumption is excessively smooth and sensitive.






By the exact same argument as above ψT−1 > QT−1 such that news utility introduces a first-
order precautionary-savings motive in the pre-committed equilibrium. Compare the above





Because ηFP(sPT−1)+ηλ (1−FP(sPT−1))>η(λ−1)(1−2FP(sPT−1)) for all sPT−1 andψT−1 >
γQT−1 monotone personal consumption is higher CT−1 > CcT−1 than pre-committed con-
sumption. Moreover, the difference ηFP(sPT−1)+ηλ (1−FP(sPT−1))−η(λ−1)(1−2FP(sPT−1))=
η(1−FP(sPT−1))+ηλFP(sPT−1) is increasing in sPT−1 such that the difference in consumption
CT−1−CcT−1 is increasing in sPT−1.
4. Consider the pre-committed first-order conditions before and after retirement. After retire-
ment the news-utility agent’s consumption from period T − R on will correspond to the
standard agent’s one, i.e.,
QT−R−1 = ψT−R−1 = QsT−R−1


















it can be easily seen that
∂ΛT−R−1
∂γ




Thus, γ < 1 does not necessarily increase or decrease ΛT−R−1 and thereby consumption
growth at retirement is not necessarily negative and smaller than consumption growth after
retirement. There is no systematic underweighting of marginal utility before or after retire-
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ment and there does not occur a drop in consumption at retirement for γ < 1.
B.5 Derivation of the power-utility model
In the following, I outline the numerical derivation of the model with a power-utility speci-
fication u(Ct) =
C1−θt
1−θ . I start with the standard model to then explain the news-utility model in
detail.
B.5.1 The standard model






subject to Xt = (Xt−1−Ct−1)R+Yt and Yt = Pt−1GtesPt esTt = PtesTt .
The maximization problem can be normalized by P1−θT−i and then becomes in normalized terms
















+ yt and yt = es
T
t .
The model can be solved by numerical backward induction as done by Gourinchas and Parker














































































































Φ′T−i is a function of savings aT−i thus I can solve for each optimal consumption level c∗T−i on
a grid of savings aT−i as c∗T−i = (Φ
′
T−i−1)




θ to then find each optimal level
of consumption for each value of the normalized cash-on-hand grid xT−i by interpolation. This
endogenous-grid method has been developed by Carroll (2001). Alternatively, I could use the
Euler equation instead of the agent’s continuation value but this solution illustrates the upcoming
solution of the news-utility model of which it is a simple case.
B.5.2 The monotone-personal and pre-committed equilibrium in the second-to-last period
Before starting with the fully-fledged problem, I outline the second-to-last period for the case
of power utility. In the second-to-last period the agent allocates his cash-on-hand XT−1 between
contemporaneous consumption CT−1 and future consumption CT , knowing that in the last period
he will consume whatever he saved in addition to last period’s income shock CT = XT = (XT−1−
CT−1)R+YT . According to the monotone-personal equilibrium solution concept, in period T −1
the agent takes the beliefs about contemporaneous and future consumption he entered the period
with {FT−2CT−1 ,FT−2CT } as given and maximizes
u(CT−1)+n(CT−1,FT−2CT−1)+ γβn(F
T−1,T−2
CT )+βET−1[u(CT )+n(CT ,F
T−1
CT )]

















To gain intuition for the model’s predictions, I explain the derivation of the first-order condition






The first two terms in the first-order condition represent marginal consumption utility and gain-
loss utility over contemporaneous consumption in period T − 1. As the agent takes his beliefs
{FT−2CT−1 ,FT−2CT } as given in the optimization, I apply Leibniz’s rule for differentiation under the
integral sign. This results in marginal gain-loss utility being the sum of states that would have
promised less consumption FT−2CT−1(CT−1), weighted by η , or more consumption 1−FT−2CT−1(CT−1),




Note that, if contemporaneous consumption is increasing in the realization of cash-on-hand then
I can simplify FT−2CT−1(CT−1) = F
T−2
XT−1(XT−1). Returning to the maximization problem the third
term represents prospective gain-loss utility over future consumption CT experienced in T −1. As
before, marginal gain-loss utility is given by the weighted sum of states u′(CT )(ηFT−2AT−1(AT−1)+
ηλ (1−FT−2AT−1(AT−1))). Note that FT−2CT (c) is defined as the probability Pr(CT < c|IT−2). Applying
a logic similar to the law of iterated expectation
Pr(CT < c|IT−2) = Pr(AT−1R+YT < c|IT−2) = Pr(AT−1 < c−YTR |IT−2)
thus if savings are increasing in the realization of cash-on-hand then I can simplify FT−2AT−1(AT−1) =
FT−2XT−1(XT−1).
The last term in the maximization problem represents consumption and gain-loss utility over
future consumption CT in the last period T , i.e., the first derivative of the agent’s continuation value
with respect to consumption or the marginal value of savings. Expected marginal gain-loss utility







(u′(CT )−u′(c))FT−1CT (c)]> βRET−1[u′(CT )] =Φ
′
T−1.
As expected marginal gain-loss disutility is positive, increasing in σY , absent if σY = 0, and in-
creases the marginal value of savings, I say that news-utility introduces an “additional precautionary-









Beyond the additional precautionary-savings motive Ψ′T−1 > Φ
′








i.e., the terms in the first-order condition vary with the income realization XT−1 so that consumption
is excessively smooth and sensitive.
B.5.3 The monotone-pre-committed equilibrium in the second-to-last-period






by the same arguments as in the exponential-utility model derivation of the pre-committed equilib-
rium.
B.5.4 The monotone-personal equilibrium path in all prior periods










again, the maximization problem can be normalized by P1−θT−i as all terms are proportional to con-
sumption utility u(·). In normalized terms, the news-utility agent’s first-order condition in any




T−i(ηFT−i−1cT−i (cT−i)+ηλ (1−FT−i−1cT−i (cT−i)))
1+ηFT−i−1aT−i (aT−i)+ηλ (1−FT−i−1aT−i (aT−i))





of aT−i until I find a fixed point of c∗T−i, aT−i, FT−i−1aT−i (aT−i), and F
T−i−1
cT−i (cT−i). The latter two
can be inferred from the observation that each cT−i + aT−i = xT−i has a certain probability given
the value of savings aT−i−1 I am currently iterating on. However, this probability varies with the
realization of permanent income es
P
T−i thus I cannot fully normalize the problem but have to find
the right consumption grid for each value of es
P
T−i rather than just one. The first-order condition







sPT−iΦ′T−i(ηFT−i−1cT−i (cT−i)+ηλ (1−FT−i−1cT−i (cT−i)))
1+ηFT−i−1aT−i (aT−i)+ηλ (1−FT−i−1aT−i (aT−i))
to find each corresponding grid value. Note that, the resulting two-dimensional grid for cT−i will
be the normalized grid for each realization of sTt and s
P
t , because I multiply both sides of the
first-order conditions with es
P






























































































B.5.5 Risk attitudes over small and large stakes
First, I suppose the agent is offered a gamble about immediate consumption in period t after
that period’s uncertainty has resolved and that period’s original consumption has taken place. I
assume that utility over immediate consumption is linear. Then, the agent is indifferent between
accepting or rejecting a 50-50 win G or lose L gamble if
0.5G−0.5L+0.5ηG−0.5ηλL = 0.
Second, I suppose the agent is offered a monetary gamble or wealth bet that concerns future con-
sumption. Suppose T →∞. I assume that his initial wealth level is At = 100,000 and Pt = 300,000.
Let fΨ(A) and fΦ(A) be the agent’s continuation value as a function of the agent’s savings At .
Then, the agent is indifferent between accepting or rejecting a 50-50 win G or lose L gamble if
0.5η( fΦ(At+G)− fΦ(At))+0.5ηλ ( fΦ(At−L)− fΦ(At))+0.5 fΨ(At+G)+0.5 fΨ(At−L)= fΨ(At−L).
B.6 Habit formation





with Ht = Ht−1 +ϑ(Ct−1−Ht−1) and ϑ ∈ [0,1] (Michaelides (2002)). Assume ϑ = 1 such that
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with Φ′T−1 being a function of savings xT−1− cT−1 and habit hT . The first-order condition can












until a fixed point of consumption and habit has been
found. The normalized habit-forming agent’s first-order condition in any period T − i is given by
c−θT−i = h
−θh+h
T−i Φ
′
T−i = h
−θh+h
T−i βET−i[(GT−i+1e
SPT−i+1)−θ(1−h)(
cT−i+1
hhT−i+1
)−θ (R
dcT−i+1
dxT−i+1
+
cT−i+1
hT−i+1
h)
+(1− dcT−i+1
dxT−i+1
)(GT−i+1eS
P
T−i+1)−θ(1−h)Φ
′
T−1].
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